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ABSTRACT
Conventional wisdom is that shareholder derivative suits are
dead. Yet this death knell is decidedly premature. The current
conception of shareholder derivative suits is based on an empirical
record limited to suits filed in Delaware or on behalf of Delaware
corporations, leaving suits outside this sphere in the shadows of
corporate law scholarship. This Article aims to fill this gap by
presenting the first empirical examination of shareholder derivative
suits in the federal courts. Using an original, hand-collected data
set, my study reveals that shareholder derivative suits are far from
dead. Shareholders file more shareholder derivative suits than
securities class actions, the area of corporate litigation that has
received nearly all of the scholarly attention. By writing off share-
holder derivative suits, scholars have missed the distinct role that
these suits play in corporate law, particularly in the area of
corporate governance. Unlike traditional litigation, remarkably few
of the suits in my study ended with monetary payments. Instead,
these suits more commonly ended with corporations agreeing to
reform their own corporate governance practices, from the number
of independent directors on their boards to the method by which they
compensate their top executives. These settlements reflect the rise of
a new type of shareholder activism, one that has gone undocumented
in the legal literature. Corporate governance has moved into the
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courtroom, and this development has important, and potentially
troubling, implications for corporate law.
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INTRODUCTION
Conventional wisdom is that shareholder derivative suits play a
small, and dwindling, role in corporate law. Once the cornerstone
of corporate law,1 these suits are now viewed as relics of an older
time, rendered obsolete by more modern means of policing corporate
misconduct such as high-stakes securities class actions, sweeping
government investigations, and the stringent listing standards of
the national stock exchanges. As the tools for monitoring corporate
managers multiply, scholars have all but abandoned shareholder
derivative suits. In the world of corporate law scholarship, share-
holder derivative suits are not just “forgotten,”2 they are “dead.”3
As a result, few scholars have deemed these suits worthy of
empirical analysis. Over the last fifteen years, there have been just
two studies of shareholder derivative suits.4 Although both made
crucial contributions to our understanding of these suits, the
empirical focus in these studies was on suits filed in Delaware state
court or on behalf of Delaware corporations.5 There remains no
comprehensive examination of shareholder derivative suits in the
federal courts, where most corporate litigation is centered. 
This dearth of empirical data comes at a particularly bad time.
As the financial markets have experienced tremendous upheaval,
corporate law has been besieged with calls for reform.6 Scholars and
1. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) (stating that
shareholder derivative suits were the “chief regulator of corporate management”). 
2. Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Forgotten Derivative Suit, 61 VAND. L. REV. 387, 389
(2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of
Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1749 n.6 (2004) (stating that “[l]ike the
proverbial cat, derivative suits have been pronounced dead on numerous occasions”); E.
Norman Veasey & Michael P. Dooley, The Role of Corporate Litigation in the Twenty-First
Century, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 131, 142 (2000) (stating that commentators have proclaimed
derivative suits “dead and gone and buried”).
4. See Davis, supra note 2; Thompson & Thomas, supra note 3. 
5. See Davis, supra note 2, at 388-89; Thompson & Thomas, supra note 3, at 1749.
6. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham & David T. Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches
to Financial Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 39 (2009) (evaluating proposals for reforming financial regulation);
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 197-98 (2008) (proposing regulatory
reforms to address systemic risk in the financial markets).
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politicians alike have called for a restructuring of market regula-
tions and renewed oversight of private litigation.7 If shareholder
derivative suits are to play any role in these efforts, it should not be
based on an incomplete snapshot of this area of the law. 
This Article aims to bridge that gap by presenting the first
empirical analysis of shareholder derivative suits in the federal
courts. My study is based on a hand-collected and original dataset
of full case records from complaint through final judgment.8 In
contrast, many studies of litigation examine only reported decisions
available through Westlaw or Lexis.9 As others have recognized,
such studies suffer from a selection bias because fewer than 5
percent of decisions are available through these databases.10
Moreover, neither Westlaw nor Lexis allows scholars to track entire
case records, which means that most litigation research is based on
a single snapshot of the studied cases rather than a comprehensive
review of the entire case record.11 As scholars are increasingly
7. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global
Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 468 (outlining an approach to
address securities class actions filed against foreign corporations); Amanda M. Rose,
Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and
Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1354-58 (2008) (proposing
reform of securities class actions that would allow the Securities and Exchange Commission
to serve as a gatekeeper).
8. Scholars have recognized the value of using full case records as the basis of research.
See David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
681, 684-85 (2007) (describing the growing legal movement in conducting empirical research
using full case records); see also Margo Schlanger & Denise Lieberman, Using Court Records
for Research, Teaching, and Policymaking: The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, 75
UMKC L. REV. 155, 163-68 (2006) (explaining the significant problems with traditional
litigation research and concluding that “[i]n short, for anyone who hopes to understand
litigation ... one specific litigation or an entire field of litigation ... there is no substitute for
court records”).
9. See Hoffman et al., supra note 8, at 686.
10. See id. at 727 (“An astonishingly low 3% of all orders are available on [Westlaw or
Lexis] databases; more than 80% of difficult orders are similarly ‘hidden’ without
explanation.”); Schlanger & Lieberman, supra note 8, at 165 (explaining that “there is now
voluminous evidence that [judges] choose to devote the time to fully developed opinion
writing in nonrepresentative ways”).
11. See Schlanger & Lieberman, supra note 8, at 163.
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recognizing,12 litigation research must be done on the ground,
studying case records from start to finish.
From this in-depth examination of shareholder derivative suits,
three important conclusions emerge. First, contrary to the conven-
tional wisdom, shareholder derivative suits are anything but dead.
Shareholders actually file more shareholder derivative suits than
securities class actions,13 the area of shareholder litigation that has
received nearly all of the scholarly attention.14 Corporate law
scholarship has missed this fact because most shareholder deriva-
tive suits are filed in federal court and nearly half are filed on
behalf of companies incorporated outside of Delaware.15
Second, corporate governance reform has moved into the
courtroom. Remarkably few of the suits in my study ended with the
corporation receiving a meaningful financial benefit. Instead,
shareholder derivative suits more commonly end with the parties
agreeing to corporate governance settlements. In these settlements,
corporations agree to reform their corporate governance practices,
from the number of independent directors on their boards to the
method by which they compensate their top executives. These
12. Over the past several years, a number of prominent studies have been published
examining full case records in discrete areas of the law. See, e.g., James D. Cox et al., There
Are Plaintiffs and ... There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action
Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355 (2008); Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What
is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111 (2009);
Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555 (2003); David L. Schwartz,
Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent
Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008); Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An
Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006);
Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154
U. PA. L. REV. 79 (2005).
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. There have been dozens, if not hundreds, of empirical studies analyzing securities
class actions over the last fifteen years. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi et al., Do Institutions
Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869 (2005); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff
Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1587 (2006) [hereinafter Cox & Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter?]; James D. Cox &
Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and
Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions To Participate in Securities Class
Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411 (2005); Eric Helland, Reputational Penalties and
the Merits of Class-Action Securities Litigation, 49 J.L. & ECON. 365 (2006).
15. See infra Part II.A.
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settlements have not been studied at all in the legal literature. The
rise of shareholder activism in the courtroom has simply flown
under the radar of corporate law scholarship. 
Third, there is significant reason to question the wisdom of
corporate governance’s move from the boardroom into the court-
room. Drawing on business and finance literature, this Article
demonstrates that corporate governance settlements often fail to
live up to their potential because they include reforms that are
unlikely to benefit corporations or their shareholders.16 Yet despite
the minimal benefits to corporations, the plaintiffs’ attorneys
studied still received substantial fees, confirming the view that
“[t]he real incentive” to file shareholder derivative suits “is usually
not the hope of return to the corporation, but the hope of handsome
fees to be recovered by plaintiffs’ counsel.”17 By writing off share-
holder derivative suits, scholars have missed the problematic role
that these suits continue to play in corporate law. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the design
and methodology of the study. Part II sets out the empirical results
of the study, examining the shareholders who file derivative suits,
the companies named in the suits, the types of claims alleged, and,
most importantly, the resolution of these suits. Part III adds a nor-
mative component, drawing on business and finance scholarship to
evaluate corporate governance settlements and concluding that
many of these settlements do little to enhance corporate value. In
the end, “corporate governance at gunpoint” may not be the best
strategy for reform.18 
16. See infra Part III.A.
17. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887 (2d Cir. 1982).
18. See William S. Lerach, Achieving Corporate Governance Enhancements Through
Litigation, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 8 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). William
S. Lerach, the (in)famous plaintiffs’ attorney, used this term in describing corporate
governance settlements, adding that “oftentimes more is obtained with a kind word and a
gun, than a kind word alone!” Id. Mr. Lerach was recently released from prison after serving
time for providing kickbacks to clients. See Joe Nocera, Serving Time, but Lacking Remorse,
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2008, at C1.
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I. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
This Part explains the methodology of the study and provides an
overview of its significance and limitations. Before turning to this
discussion, however, a brief explanation of the role of derivative
suits and securities class actions in corporate law is warranted.
Derivative suits and securities class actions are the procedural
mechanisms to enforce two different branches of corporate law.
Derivative suits are the procedural mechanism to enforce state
fiduciary duty law.19 In a derivative suit, the corporation is the
functional plaintiff—that is, the real party in interest—and the
allegations are that the corporation’s current or former officers and
directors breached their fiduciary duties to the corporation.20 Any
recovery in a derivative suit is returned to the corporation.21 In a
derivative suit, despite the fact that the suit is brought in its name,
the corporation’s role is limited because shareholders, whom I will
call derivative plaintiffs, file these suits on behalf of corporations.22
The law gives shareholders this power because corporate officers
and directors, who normally decide whether corporations should file
lawsuits, are often implicated in the alleged wrongdoing and cannot
be trusted to make unbiased decisions regarding the merits of these
suits.23
Securities class actions are the procedural mechanism to enforce
the federal securities laws.24 In a securities class action, the plain-
tiffs are shareholders alleging that a corporation and its individual
officers and directors violated the federal securities laws by making
false or misleading public statements.25 Any recovery in the lawsuit
goes to the corporation’s shareholders.26
19. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
20. See Joy, 692 F.2d at 887.
21. See id.
22. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811.
23. See id.
24. Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 860 (2003).
25. See id. at 870-72.
26. See id. at 863-64, 883.
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Although derivative suits and securities class actions are both
key procedural tools in corporate law, scholars have focused nearly
all of their attention on securities class actions, studying these suits
from every angle.27 As a result, scholars now know almost every-
thing there is to know about securities class actions, but next to
nothing about derivative suits.28 The time has come to explore the
unexplored side of shareholder litigation.
To understand the role of derivative suits in the federal courts,
this study examined the full case records of derivative suits filed in
federal district courts over a twelve-month period in 2005 and
2006.29 The cases were identified by searching the “Dockets” data-
base in Westlaw, which includes the dockets of cases in the federal
district courts.30 The search was limited to dockets that included
any variation of the term “derivative.”31 
This search produced a list of 478 cases. I then culled from this
list cases that were not shareholder derivative suits, cases that
were filed before the relevant time period, duplicate cases, and
cases that were filed under seal. Two hundred ninety-one cases
remained after these suits were culled from the study. I then culled
an additional 109 cases that were consolidated by court order. If a
suit from my study was consolidated with other suits, I tracked the
consolidated suit, even if some of the constituent suits that made up
the consolidated suit were not filed during the relevant time period.
On the other hand, if two or more suits were filed on behalf of a
single plaintiff corporation, but these suits were not consolidated,
27. See supra note 14.
28. Scholars have been calling for additional empirical data regarding derivative suits
for decades, noting that existing data is sparse and “reveals a focus on only a few of the wide
range of possible questions that might be addressed.” Bryant G. Garth et al., Empirical
Research and the Shareholder Derivative Suit: Toward a Better Informed Debate, 48 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 149 (1985). 
29. The twelve-month period was July 1, 2005 through June 30, 2006. The start date was
chosen because most districts had adopted electronic case filing by the middle of 2005,
allowing electronic access to nearly all of the case records. The end date was chosen to allow
sufficient time for most of the cases in the study to reach final judgment.
30. Specifically, the “Dockets — U.S. District Courts Combined” database includes
“comprehensive full docket coverage [beginning in] January 2000.” Westlaw Database
Directory, http://directory.westlaw.com/scope/default.asp?db=Dock-DCT-ALL&RS=WDIR2.
0&VR=2.0 (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
31. The search used was “derivativ! & da(aft 6/30/2005 & bef 7/1/2006).”
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I tracked each suit separately. This sorting process led to a total
population of 182 cases.32 
I then reviewed the entire case record, from original complaint to
final judgment, for all 182 suits using the Public Access to Court
Electronic Records (PACER) system.33 Data from the case records
were coded into a specially designed database.34 I coded more than
200 variables for each suit. These variables included nearly every
substantive aspect of the suits, from the parties, to the claims, to
the motions and orders and ultimate resolution of the suits. This in-
depth review makes this study the most comprehensive examina-
tion of derivative suits that has ever been conducted. 
This search methodology has certain limitations. First, although
the search likely uncovered nearly all derivative suits filed in
federal court during the relevant time period, it is impossible to
guarantee that the search uncovered all such cases. This limitation
is unavoidable in litigation research. The documents in the PACER
system are not text searchable and, therefore, there is no perfect
way to capture all cases of a given type. Nonetheless, unlike the
dockets of other types of cases, the dockets of derivative suits
typically note that the case is a derivative suit on the docket itself,
usually by specifying that the shareholder sued derivatively on
behalf of the plaintiff corporation. Accordingly, a search of the
dockets database likely uncovered most, if not all, of the federal
derivative suits filed during the relevant time period. 
Second, the dataset includes a number of cases that may not
reflect the typical derivative suit. Specifically, 40 of the 182 cases
32. Ten cases from the list were sealed and were therefore excluded from the study. I was
unable to confirm whether these suits were derivative suits. In addition, the record from one
derivative suit was not available on PACER, and I could not obtain hard copies of the record
because it was in chambers.
33. I obtained nearly all of the case records from PACER. A few districts did not provide
electronic access to case filings at the start of the survey period. I worked with a copy service
in these districts to obtain hard copies of the case records. 
34. I used several standard procedures to ensure the accuracy of the data. All coders
received comprehensive training and a detailed code book to assist in their coding. Coders
also noted any unusual cases or situations. I then individually reviewed the coding in each
case. After all of the cases were coded, I had twenty-five cases recoded without reference to
the prior coding. I compared the coding and resolved any discrepancies. The data were 94
percent accurate. If the plaintiff filed more than one complaint in the case, coding was based
on the last filed complaint. 
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(22 percent) involved allegations that the defendants backdated or
otherwise repriced stock options. A company backdates stock
options when it dates stock options prior to the date that the
company actually granted the options. By backdating stock options,
companies can manipulate, and generally increase, the value of
these options, a practice that often violates accounting and tax
rules and can make the company’s public disclosures false or mis-
leading.35 These suits occupied the front pages of newspapers when
the scandal broke,36 but they are different in several important
ways from the other suits in the study. Specifically, these suits,
which I will call stock option suits, were filed exclusively against
large public companies, they disproportionately settled, and these
settlements resulted in more value for the plaintiff corporations
than the settlements in many of the other suits.37
Despite their unique characteristics, these suits reflect an
important facet of shareholder litigation. In any given year, most
derivative suits are what I term “classic” derivative suits. These
suits turn on traditional allegations of corporate wrongdoing,
including accounting irregularities, false public statements, or
abuse of control by a controlling shareholder. A significant number
of derivative suits, however, are more episodic, reflecting the
financial crisis du jour. In 2003-2004, for example, derivative
plaintiffs set their sights on mutual funds, alleging that these funds
had engaged in illegal “market timing” by allowing key clients to
profit by placing trades after business hours.38 In 2005-2006, the
time period covered by this study, these episodic suits focused on
stock option backdating. From 2008 to the present, there has been
35. See Charles Forelle, As Companies Probe Backdating, More Top Officials Take a Fall,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2006, at A1.
36. See, e.g., Eric Dash, 2 Are Charged in Criminal Case on Stock Options, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 2006, at A1; Forelle, supra note 35, at A1; Mark Maremont, Authorities Probe
Improper Backdating of Options, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2005, at A1.
37. See infra Part II.D.4.b, tbl.2.
38. See James N. Benedict et al., The Aftermath of the Mutual Fund Crisis, 38 REV. OF
SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 261, 261 (2005) (“Beginning in 2003, ... the plaintiffs’ bar set its
sights on mutual funds, filing over five hundred private class actions and derivative suits
against mutual fund advisors.”).
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an explosion of derivative suits relating to the subprime lending
crisis and the resulting credit crunch.39 
A study of derivative suits that did not include these episodic
suits would miss an important facet of shareholder litigation. I have
accordingly included both types of suits in my study but noted
below when the stock option suits differ significantly from the
classic suits. With these points in mind, we turn to the findings of
the study. 
II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL DERIVATIVE SUITS
This Part sets out the results of the study. These results demon-
strate that derivative suits are a much bigger player in the world
of shareholder litigation than scholars have recognized. The study
also uncovers the sharp resemblance between derivative suits and
other types of shareholder litigation, a resemblance that has gone
unnoticed in the legal literature. The results are divided into four
sections. The first section analyzes the number of derivative suits
in the federal courts, highlighting the long-overlooked role of these
suits in corporate law. The next three sections proceed chronologi-
cally through the lifecycle of litigation. The second section focuses
on the complaints, analyzing the parties on both sides of the
litigation as well as their allegations. The third section focuses on
the procedural hurdles in derivative suits, hurdles that waylay
many shareholders in their effort to vindicate corporate claims. The
final section focuses on the resolution of derivative suits, providing
a foundation for the reevaluation of the role of derivative suits in
countering corporate misconduct.
A. The Unseen Importance of Derivative Suits
An initial look at the data demonstrates that derivative suits play
a far larger role in corporate law than previous empirical studies
have recognized. Conventional wisdom is that derivative suits are
39. See Subprime-Related Derivative Lawsuits: The List, The D&O Diary, http://www.
dandodiary.com/2008/04/articles/subprime-litigation/subprimere lated-derivative-lawsuits-
the-list/index.html (Apr. 8, 2008) (listing twenty-eight derivative suits filed in 2007 through
2009 related to subprime lending and the credit crisis). 
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bit players in corporate law,40 and this view has been confirmed by
the few empirical studies in this area.41 In their study of derivative
suits filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery in 1999 and 2000,
Randall Thomas and Robert Thompson found that shareholders
filed approximately forty derivative suits per year during this time
period.42 The other major study of derivative suits over the last
fifteen years, conducted by Kenneth Davis, examined reported
decisions of derivative suits available on Westlaw and Lexis.43 This
study examined a total of 294 suits filed over more than seven
years, or again approximately 40 suits per year.44 Thus, the existing
empirical literature has unearthed a relatively small number of
derivative suits, leading scholars to conclude that “the number of
derivative suits has declined markedly in recent years.”45 
My study found that derivative suits have not disappeared—they
have simply moved into the federal courts. During the twelve-
month period covered by my study, shareholders filed a total of 182
40. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its
Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1492
(2006) (“Derivative suits have been eclipsed in recent years by [other] form[s] of
representative litigation.”); Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate
Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1473 n.164 (2006) (stating that empirical studies
of derivative suits have found that these suits “are not performing a large role in corporate
governance”). 
41. There have been only two studies of derivative suits over the past fifteen years.
Davis, supra note 2; Thompson & Thomas, supra note 3. In addition, there were a handful
of studies conducted prior to the mid-1990s, all of which have received considerable attention
in the academy. To review these prior studies, see Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit:
Litigation Without Foundation?, J.L. ECON. & ORG., Spring 1991, at 55, 64; Thomas M. Jones,
An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action
Lawsuits, 60 B.U. L. REV. 542 (1980); Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the
Incidence of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 1971-1978, 60 B.U. L. REV.
306 (1980); FRANKLIN S. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE
SUITS (1944).
42. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 3, at 1762. This number reflects the number
of “lead cases,” rather than complaints, filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery in 1999 and
2000. See id. The number of lead cases refers to the number of cases remaining after all cases
arising out of the same controversy have been consolidated, a similar metric to the one used
in my study. Id.
43. See Davis, supra note 2, at 418 n.162.
44. See id. at 418.
45. See Randall S. Thomas, The Evolving Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate
Governance and Corporate Litigation, 61 VAND. L. REV. 299, 305 (2008).
1762 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1749
suits in the federal courts.46 This figure is more than four times
higher than the number of derivative suits found by prior studies
and more than four times higher than the number of derivative
suits filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery.47 The federal courts
are now the center of a significant percentage of corporate litiga-
tion, a fact that the focus on state courts has caused scholars to
miss.
Even more importantly, my study reveals that derivative suits
may well outnumber other types of shareholder litigation, a finding
that is again directly contrary to the conventional wisdom. The
relatively low number of derivative suits found in prior studies has
led scholars to conclude that, “compared to federal securities class
actions, or to state court acquisition-oriented class actions, deriva-
tive suits are running a weak third in terms of their importance to
shareholders.”48 My study challenges this conclusion. Adding the
182 suits in my study to the approximately 40 suits filed per year
in the Delaware Court of Chancery yields an approximate estimate
of more than 220 derivative suits filed each year.49 Moreover, this
number does not include derivative suits that are filed in other
state courts—suits that are currently beyond the reach of litigation
researchers because few state court dockets are searchable. In
contrast, shareholders on average file fewer than 200 securities
46. A note of clarification is important here. As explained in the discussion of
methodology above, my study included all derivative suits in which any of the constituent
suits were filed during the twelve-month period at issue. See supra note 29 and
accompanying text. A relatively small number of these consolidated suits included
constituent suits that were filed before and/or after the relevant time period. I am not
claiming that shareholders file exactly 182 derivative suits per year, a claim that would not
account for the potential double-counting of consolidated suits or the inevitable variation in
litigation from year to year. My point is that shareholders file far more derivative suits than
prior studies have recognized.
47. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
48. See Thomas, supra note 45, at 305.
49. This number is an estimate, as the precise number of derivative suits undoubtedly
varies each year. My data are from a single twelve-month period, while the forty suits
Thompson and Thomas studied were from an earlier two-year time period. See Thompson &
Thomas, supra note 3, at 1762. Nonetheless, the number of derivative suits is significant and
likely exceeds the number of securities class actions filed each year, especially when one
considers the number of derivative suits filed in states other than Delaware that are not
included in these figures.
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class actions per year, fewer than the number of derivative suits.50
Shareholders file approximately 110 state court acquisition-oriented
class actions each year, again fewer than the number of derivative
suits.51 
As this comparison demonstrates, the sheer numbers do not
justify the scholarly neglect of derivative suits. Scholars have
written off derivative suits based on the small number of these suits
in the Delaware Court of Chancery, overlooking the fact that
derivative suits have moved into the federal courts. Derivative suits
are not dead. Shareholders are still filing them and corporations are
still fighting them—the legal academy simply has not known it.
This insight, however, is only the start of the inquiry. Once it is
clear that derivative suits are a much more important part of
shareholder litigation than previously recognized, the next question
is what role these suits play. This question requires an in-depth
examination of the suits themselves—an examination conducted in
light of empirical evidence from other types of shareholder litiga-
tion. We begin this inquiry by looking at the various parties
involved in the litigation, from the shareholders to the corporations
to the individual officers and directors.
B. Surveying the Complaints
My analysis of shareholder derivative suits begins at the
beginning of the suits themselves. I first explore the geography of
shareholder litigation. I then turn to the complaints, examining the
shareholders who typically file these suits and their allegations.
1. Mapping the Complaints
The suits in my study were spread throughout the federal courts,
with at least one suit filed in every judicial circuit. As the figure
below indicates, however, a disproportionate number of suits were
filed in district courts in the Second and Ninth Circuits.
50. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS: 2006: A YEAR
IN REVIEW 2-3 (2007), available at http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/YIR2006.pdf
[hereinafter CORNERSTONE 2006 FILINGS].
51. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 3, at 1762. 
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In all, 26.7 percent of the suits were filed in the Ninth Circuit,
while 24.7 percent were filed in the Second Circuit.52 These
percentages are nearly twice the percentages of civil cases filed in
each of these two circuits more generally.53 The concentration of
suits in these two circuits is not especially surprising. District
courts in New York and California have traditionally been hotbeds
of corporate litigation, as empirical studies of securities class
actions have demonstrated.54 
1
12
8
49
9
8
10
14
6
12
45
8
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
D.C. Circuit
11th Circuit
10th Circuit
9th Circuit
8th Circuit
7th Circuit
6th Circuit
5th Circuit
4th Circuit
3rd Circuit
2nd Circuit
1st Circuit
Figure 1: Where Derivative Suits are
Filed, by Circuit
Number of 
Suits
52. The prevalence of suits in the Ninth Circuit is partially explained by the large
number of stock option suits. Of the 40 such suits, 29 (72.5 percent) were filed in the Ninth
Circuit. If the stock option cases are removed from the sample, the Second and Ninth
Circuits still remain the dominant circuits, but the percentage of cases filed in the Ninth
Circuit falls to 14 percent, while the percentage of cases filed in the Second Circuit rises to
29.6 percent.
53. See JAMES C. DUFF, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 139 tbl.C (2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/
JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf (noting that, in 2007, approximately 10 percent of civil cases
were filed in district courts in the Second Circuit, while approximately 15 percent of civil
cases were filed in district courts in the Ninth Circuit).
54. Between 1997 and 2007, nearly half of all securities class actions were filed in these
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2. Detailing the Parties
a. Derivative Plaintiffs
Turning to the derivative complaints, the first question is who
are the shareholders who are filing these lawsuits? My study found
that derivative plaintiffs are rarely corporate insiders. Only 15 of
the 182 cases (8.2 percent) involved a derivative plaintiff who also
served as a director or officer of the plaintiff corporation, and all 15
involved private companies. Moreover, although derivative plain-
tiffs rarely disclosed their precise ownership interest in the plaintiff
corporations, few shareholders appeared to own a significant stake
in these corporations. Accordingly, even if they were victorious,
their individual recoveries were minimal. What then is their
motivation for filing these lawsuits? 
The answer turns on the role of institutional investors and other
activist investors in shareholder litigation. Institutional investors
have long been the preferred plaintiffs in shareholder litigation, as
the example of securities class actions makes clear. Prior to 1995,
securities class actions were widely viewed as a prime example of
lawyer-driven litigation, with shareholders playing little or no role
in directing the litigation.55 Corporations were often forced to pay
nuisance settlements rather than incur the high costs of litigation,
a phenomenon that Congress concluded would “wreak havoc on our
Nation's boardrooms and deter capital formation.”56 Congress
sought to end these practices by enacting the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, or PSLRA.57 The PSLRA encouraged
institutional investors, such as banks or other financial institutions,
two circuits, roughly the same percentage as the derivative suits in my study. See
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS, 2008: A YEAR IN REVIEW 20
(2009), available at http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/YIR2008.pdf.
55. See William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371,
397-98 (2001) (“The common thread [behind the 1995 reform of the federal securities fraud
laws] was distrust for the plaintiffs' securities bar, characterized repeatedly by the sound-bite
provided, perhaps accidentally, by a prominent plaintiffs’ attorney: ‘I have the greatest
practice of law in the world. I have no clients.’” (footnote omitted)). 
56. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 10 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 689.
57. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
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to serve as lead plaintiffs by creating a strong presumption that the
lead plaintiff in a securities class action should be the shareholder
applicant with the largest financial stake.58 Congress hoped that
institutional investors, who have to answer to their own constituen-
cies, would pursue more meritorious litigation and therefore end
the abuses that had plagued this area of the law.59 
By and large, however, the empirical evidence has not borne out
these expectations. In a study of 260 post-PSLRA settlements
between 1995 and 2002, James D. Cox and Randall S. Thomas
found that the PSLRA did increase the percentage of institutional
investors serving as lead plaintiffs, but their influence has not
lived up to the heady congressional expectations of the 1990s.60
Approximately 40 percent of the post-PSLRA cases included at least
one institutional plaintiff,61 up from less than 10 percent before the
enactment of the PSLRA.62 Only 17.6 percent of the total study,
however, included a financial institution—the classic institutional
investor envisioned by Congress63—as a plaintiff.64 Moreover, these
financial institutions were not banks or mutual funds, but rather
public or labor pension/retirement funds.65 The study found, how-
ever, that the presence of institutions as lead plaintiffs in securities
class actions had a small, but measurable, impact on settlement
value, raising settlements 0.04 percent for every 1 percent increase
in provable losses.66
Derivative suits, by contrast, have largely escaped legislative
scrutiny. There are no statutes comparable to the PSLRA’s lead
plaintiff provisions encouraging institutional investors to file
derivative suits. Surprisingly, however, institutional investors
are still quite common in federal derivative suits.67 Of the 141
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2006).
59. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690.
60. Cox & Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter?, supra note 14, at 1587-92.
61. See id. at 1623-24. For the purposes of this discussion, an “institutional investor”
includes any investor who is not a natural person. I have therefore included in this 40
percent figure plaintiffs that Cox and Thomas categorize as either institutions or entities.
62. See id. at 1590.
63. See id. at 1596-97 & n.140.
64. See id. at 1623-24 & n.139.
65. See id. at 1610, 1620.
66. See id. at 1636.
67. Professors Cox and Thomas calculated the percentage of institutional investors
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derivative suits filed on behalf of public companies, 47 (33.3
percent) involved some kind of institutional plaintiff.68 Moreover, in
27 of these cases (19.1 percent of the public company suits), there
was at least one financial institution named as a plaintiff, a greater
percentage than Cox and Thomas found in their study of securities
class actions. Once again, these financial institutions were almost
all public or labor pension/retirement funds, rather than more
traditional financial institutions such as banks or mutual funds.69
These figures demonstrate that financial institutions such as pen-
sion and retirement funds are actually more common as plaintiffs
in federal derivative suits than securities class actions, at least
during the period covered by this study. This fact is counter-
intuitive, given that securities class actions tend to draw far higher
settlement awards and thus return more bang for the buck for
investors willing to lend their name to the suits. 
A further examination of the data, however, indicates that
institutional investors were far more likely to serve as plaintiffs in
the stock option suits than in the more classic derivative suits in
my study. Financial institutions served as plaintiffs in 37.5 percent
of the stock option cases, but only 11.9 percent of the classic public
company derivative suits. As explained in more detail below in Part
II.D, these cases are the most meritorious suits in the study, at
least if merit is determined by the relief obtained by the plaintiff
corporation.70 Accordingly, it appears that, just as in securities class
serving as lead plaintiffs. See id. at 1618-19. Courts appoint lead plaintiffs in derivative suits
less frequently (43 of the 141 public company cases, or 30.5 percent, and none of the private
company suits), and as a result, my study measured whether any institutional shareholder
served as a plaintiff in the suit, even if there were other noninstitutional shareholders in the
suits as well. 
68. On the private company side, none of the suits in the sample involved a public
pension fund or other financial institution. Eleven of the 41 private company suits (26.8
percent) did include one or more other institutional plaintiffs. 
69. Only one mutual fund served as a plaintiff in my study, and no banks served as
plaintiffs. For an explanation of why banks and mutual funds are resistant to serve as
plaintiffs in securities litigation, see Cox & Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter?, supra note
14, at 1602-10, which explains that these institutions typically “are not eager to become, or
to align themselves with, antagonists of their clientele.” The same reasoning likely applies
in derivative suits.
70. Of course, one other measure of merit is the percentage of potential and/or claimed
damages obtained by the derivative plaintiff. The derivative plaintiffs in my study rarely
placed an exact dollar amount on the damages that they sought, nor were these damages
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actions, institutional investors in derivative suits are drawn to the
bigger, higher-quality cases. 
Derivative suits also have their fair share of repeat players,
another characteristic common in securities class actions. The vast
majority of plaintiffs in my study appeared in only one of the study
cases. Twenty-one plaintiffs, however, appeared in more than one.
Of these twenty-one repeat players, eighteen appeared in two cases,
three appeared in three cases, and one plaintiff (the Alaska
Electrical Pension Fund) appeared in five cases. All of these repeat
players appeared in public company suits.
Interestingly, several shareholders in my study have made
frequent appearances in the world of shareholder litigation even
outside the time period covered by my study. Steven Staehr filed
just one suit in my study, but according to the Wall Street Journal,
he is a “frequent filer” of shareholder derivative suits and has filed
“at least seven other shareholder suits” over the past five years.71
Another plaintiff, Robert L. Garber, who filed two suits in my study,
testified in a deposition last year in New York federal court that he
has filed more than twenty-five shareholder derivative suits.72
Following his deposition, the court determined that Mr. Garber was
“appallingly ignorant of the many derivative actions that have been
filed in his name”73 because he did “not exert himself to become
informed about the litigations in which he serves as named plaintiff
unless his performance is being closely examined.” The court also
noted that Mr. Garber’s law firm “initiated this litigation and
entirely controlled it.”74 As the court noted, “[t]he very abuses that
led to the reform embodied by the PSLRA permeate the world of
derivative litigation as well.”75
There were even more repeat players among the law firms
involved in the suits. My study reveals that a fairly small group of
plaintiffs’ law firms file the vast majority of the suits. Three
readily ascertainable. 
71. Nathan Koppel, Some Shareholder Plaintiffs Have Little at Stake, WALL ST. J., Mar.
26, 2009, at A9. 
72. In re JPMorgan Chase & Co. S’holder Deriv. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 974(DLC), 2008 WL
4298588, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2008).
73. Id.
74. Id. at *8.
75. Id. at *10.
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firms—Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins, Robbins Umeda
& Fink, and Federman & Sherwood—each appeared in more than
thirty of the suits. Three other firms appeared in ten or more of the
lawsuits.76 Indeed, the ten most common plaintiffs’ firms in the
study were involved in nearly 75 percent of the public company
suits.77 None of these firms was involved in any of the private
company suits. These figures reveal a cadre of plaintiffs’ firms
responsible for a significant percentage of derivative suits filed on
behalf of public companies. 
This phenomenon will not surprise those familiar with other
types of shareholder litigation because securities class actions are
also dominated by a small group of law firms.78 What may be
surprising, however, is how little overlap there is between the law
firms involved in derivative suits and the law firms involved in
securities class actions. Only two of the ten most represented law
firms in my study appeared as one of the top ten plaintiffs’ law
firms in securities class actions in 2006, 2007, or 2008.79 Many of
these firms file securities class actions but are much smaller
players in this category of suits,80 suggesting that derivative suits
may serve as a launching pad for firms that aspire to the more
lucrative practice of securities class actions.81
76. These law firms were Barroway Topaz Kessler Meltzer & Check (previously Schiffrin
Barroway Topaz & Kessler), Faruqi & Faruqi, and the Law Offices of Thomas G. Amon. 
77. As explained below, most suits involved a number of law firms, so more than one of
these firms appeared in many of the suits and many suits included a number of consolidated
suits. 
78. See, e.g., Choi & Thompson, supra note 40, at 1514 (finding that there has been
“substantial continuity” in the plaintiffs’ firms that file securities class actions both before
and after the PSLRA).
79. These two firms are Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins and Barroway Topaz
Kessler Meltzer & Check. I compared the top firms in my study with RiskMetrics Group’s
list of top plaintiffs’ law firms ranked by the total dollar amount of final securities class
action settlements occurring in 2006, 2007, and 2008. See, e.g., RiskMetrics Group, SCAS 50,
http://www.riskmetrics.com/white_papers/scas50_2008 (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
80. As one example, Robbins Umeda & Fink filed thirty-four suits in my study, making
it the second most common law firm in my study, but it ranked only forty-fourth in the 2007
RiskMetrics Group list of firms participating in securities class actions. See RiskMetrics
Group, SCAS 50, http://www.riskmetrics.com/issgovernance/scas/scas50_2007.html (last
visited Feb. 15, 2010).
81. Another explanation may be that smaller firms cannot afford the costs of litigating
securities class actions, given the expensive expert testimony that is increasingly common
in such cases. 
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As the above analysis demonstrates, institutional investors are
just as active in derivative suits as in securities class actions, and
there is an active plaintiffs’ bar in derivative suit litigation just as
in securities class actions. The examination now turns to the
plaintiff corporations, the entities at the heart of these suits. 
b. Plaintiff Corporations
Commentators have suggested that the real value of derivative
suits is in policing managers of smaller public companies.82 Such
companies do not reap as much benefit from other enforcement
mechanisms because they are too small to be named in most
securities class actions and too big to take advantage of contractual
protections common in smaller, privately held companies.83 Yet the
data in my study suggest that derivative suits are disproportion-
ately filed against large public companies. Out of the 182 cases in
my study, 141 (77.5 percent) were filed against public companies.
These 141 cases involved a total of 126 different corporations.84
Another 41 suits were filed against a total of 45 private compa-
nies.85 
As Figure 2 indicates, the vast majority of the 126 public
company plaintiffs trade on large public exchanges. Fifty-eight
companies (46.0 percent) trade on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE). Another 60 companies (47.6 percent) trade on the
NASDAQ. Only 8 companies (6.3 percent) trade on the American
Stock Exchange or another small public exchange.
82. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 2, at 450.
83. See id.
84. Some companies were named in two or more suits that were not consolidated and
thus were tracked separately. 
85. A few private company suits were filed on behalf of more than one company. 
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As this Figure demonstrates, derivative suits are not the province
of small disputes within small corporations. Rather, derivative suits
are filed on behalf of large public corporations, the same types of
companies often named in other types of litigation aimed at
deterring corporate misconduct. The next question, therefore, is
whether derivative suits are targeting the same defendants as these
other suits.
c. Defendants
The conventional wisdom is that derivative suits target directors,
while securities class actions target officers (as well as the corpora-
tion itself).86 My study indicates that derivative suits, especially
public company derivative suits, target directors and officers alike,
although more directors than officers find themselves in the
litigation crosshairs. The derivative plaintiffs in the public company
suits named a median number of twelve defendants per suit.
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86. Thompson & Sale, supra note 24, at 895 (“State law fiduciary duty complaints are
brought against directors, but federal claims are made against officers.”).
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Consistent with the conventional wisdom, these plaintiffs targeted
a significant number of directors—a median of nine per suit. This
number reflects the fact that most complaints named the entire
board of directors.87 
Yet the complaints frequently named a number of corporate
officers as well, including the Chief Executive Officer in 137 cases
(97.2 percent), the Chief Financial Officer in 115 cases (81.6
percent), and the Chief Operating Officer in 69 cases (48.9
percent).88 Even certain lower-ranked officers were named in a
substantial minority of cases. In a statistic that will strike fear into
the hearts of in-house counsel everywhere, corporate general
counsels were named in 31 of the public company cases (22
percent). The Controller or Treasurer was named in 30 of the cases
(21.3 percent). Finally, corporate vice presidents or other top
officers were named in 78 of the cases (55.3 percent).89 As these
figures demonstrate, directors and officers alike have reason to fear
being named in derivative suits. 
In sharp contrast, corporate outsiders were rarely named in the
suits. Only 16 of the 141 public company complaints (11.3 percent)
named a corporate outsider as a defendant, a category broadly
defined to include any individual or entity with no apparent
relationship to the inside defendants.90 These corporate outsiders
included only three law firms and three investment banks or other
financial institutions.91
87. The practice of naming the entire board of directors likely stems from the fact that
most derivative plaintiffs choose not to make a presuit demand on the plaintiff corporation’s
board of directors and instead attempt to claim that demand would have been futile, typically
because the board itself was involved in the alleged misconduct. See infra Part II.C.1. 
88. Many of these figures may have been so high in part because these top officers are
often on the plaintiff corporation’s board of directors and therefore were swept up when the
derivative plaintiff targeted the entire board. On the other hand, there were a significant
number of cases in which the derivative plaintiff made specific allegations against the CEO
and/or the CFO in their officer capacities. 
89. I included in this category vice presidents of any level, directors, officers, or other
individuals who appeared to have an equivalent role in the company. I did not include
corporate secretaries. 
90. More specifically, a corporate outsider was defined to include entities that had no
corporate relationship to the plaintiff corporation—thus excluding subsidiaries and parent
companies—or individuals who were neither employed by the corporation nor related to any
individual employed by the corporation. 
91. Although derivative suits typically include breach of fiduciary duty claims, which
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If the plaintiffs in the public company cases painted with a fairly
broad brush, the plaintiffs in private company cases aimed with a
rifle shot. These plaintiffs named a median number of three
defendants per suit, a quarter of the number named in public
company cases. Moreover, the median number of directors in the
private company suits was one, and nineteen of the cases named no
directors at all, focusing solely on the officers or other individuals
directly responsible for the alleged wrongdoing. The derivative
plaintiffs named the plaintiff corporation’s Chief Executive Officer
in slightly more than 40 percent of the suits. Other top officers,
such as the Chief Financial Officer and the Chief Operating Officer,
were named in less than 10 percent of the suits.92 Approximately
one-quarter of the private company suits named an outside
defendant, including three law firms and two investment banks or
financial institutions. 
In short, public and private company derivative suits look quite
different. Shareholders in public company suits target a significant
number of defendants, which often include directors and officers.
Private company suits target a more focused group of defendants,
often naming only the few directors or officers centrally involved in
the alleged misconduct. Having examined the parties on both sides
of these suits, the focus now turns to the allegations at the heart of
the suits. 
3. Analyzing the Allegations
The allegations in federal derivative suits illustrate the impor-
tant similarities between derivative suits and securities class
actions—similarities that the legal literature largely overlooks. As
detailed above, in securities class actions, shareholders typically
cannot be asserted against outside defendants, derivative plaintiffs can file other types of
claims against these defendants, such as aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty,
breach of contract, negligence, or malpractice claims. See, e.g., Verified Shareholder
Derivative Complaint at ¶¶ 401-03, Esther Sadowsky Testamentary Trust v. Brendsel, No.
05-CV-2596, 2005 WL 689263 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2005) (asserting aiding and abetting claims
against four investment banks on behalf of Freddie Mac).
92. Specifically, the derivative plaintiff named the Chief Executive Officer in 17 of the
lawsuits (41.5 percent), the Chief Financial Officer in 4 cases (9.8 percent), and the Chief
Operating Officer in 3 cases (7.3 percent).
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allege that the corporation’s public statements were false or
misleading because the corporation failed to disclose problems with
its business model or financial results.93 Studies of securities class
actions demonstrate that these allegations follow a common
pattern, with nearly 90 percent of complaints alleging misrepresen-
tations in financial documents and more than 40 percent of
complaints alleging that corporate insiders engaged in insider
trading.94 
The public company derivative suits in my study looked strik-
ingly similar.95 More than 90 percent of the public company
complaints included claims that the corporation or its officers and
directors made false or misleading statements to the market—the
exact same allegations that form the basis of securities class
actions. More than 80 percent of the public company complaints
alleged that the plaintiff corporation had misreported its financial
results. Approximately 60 percent of the public company suits
included allegations of insider trading.96 
Even more interestingly, more than 30 percent of the derivative
complaints filed on behalf of public companies alleged a claim under
the federal securities laws, under either section 10(b) or 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.97 This point is significant. Several
scholars have noted similarities between derivative claims and
securities fraud claims,98 but no one has documented the rise of
securities fraud claims themselves in derivative suits. Derivative
93. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
94. See CORNERSTONE 2006 FILINGS, supra note 50, at 20. In computing these figures, I
used a weighted average of the cases from 2005 and 2006, the same time period from which
the cases in my study were drawn. 
95. This analysis is based on the last-filed complaint in the case. 
96. This percentage is based on the 101 classic public company suits, or the suits that did
not include allegations of backdated stock options. I did not include the stock option suits in
this calculation because the derivative plaintiffs in such suits often included allegations of
insider trading in their complaints, but did not specify whether these allegations were
separate from the backdating claims. 
97. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006). Specifically, 45 of the 141 public company suits (31.9 percent)
included section 10(b) and/or 14(a) claims. Thirty-eight of these suits (26.9 percent) included
section 10(b) claims, while 39 suits (27.7 percent) included section 14(a) claims. 
98. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 2, at 412-14; Jessica M. Erickson, Corporate Misconduct
and the Perfect Storm of Shareholder Litigation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 75, 80-92 (2008).
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suits do not just resemble securities fraud claims—they often are
securities fraud claims. 
Figure 3 highlights the similarities between the allegations made
in securities class actions and federal derivative suits during the
relevant time period.99
In addition, the structure of the derivative complaints in my
study strongly resembled complaints in securities class actions. The
similarity is difficult to measure, but it will be familiar to anyone
who has practiced in this area. A securities class action complaint
follows a fairly standard pattern. The shareholder plaintiffs include
pages of lengthy block quotes from the corporation’s public state-
ments that the shareholders claim were false or misleading. These
quotes usually describe the company’s business in glowing terms,
detailing strong revenue growth or strong financial results. These
quotes are almost always followed by a section—often titled “The
60
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99. The data for securities class actions in Figure 3 is a weighted average for securities
class actions filed in 2005 and 2006. See CORNERSTONE 2006 FILINGS, supra note 50, at 3.
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Truth is Revealed”100—detailing the subsequent disclosure of the
company’s poor performance. 
Many complaints in my study followed a similar pattern. The
complaints were typically quite long and often spanned more than
a hundred pages with hundreds of paragraphs of detailed allega-
tions. And, like securities class action complaints, the complaints
included long block quotes from the company’s press releases or
public filings. Many of the complaints even included the same
“truth is revealed” finale.
These parallels between securities class actions and derivative
suits reflect a larger trend of shareholders filing derivative suits on
the heels of filing a securities class action. In my study, the majority
of the public company suits were accompanied by a parallel
securities class action. A few of the cases even included securities
class claims in the same complaint as the derivative claims. Other
practitioners have recognized this trend, opining that “[p]rudent
defense attorneys should anticipate that a federal securities class
lawsuit will give birth to ... a parallel derivative lawsuit.”101 Larry
Ellison, the Chief Executive Office of Oracle Corporation, even
noted this phenomenon in a brief filed with the Supreme Court of
California in which he argued that “shareholders have transformed
the derivative action into a new way to litigate [securities] fraud
claims.”102
100. See, e.g., Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal
Securities Laws at 26, Minneapolis Firefighters’ Relief Ass’n v. MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc.,
No. 08-01411 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2009); Class Action Complaint at 18, New Orleans
Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Novagold Res., Inc., No. 08-10181, 2008 WL 5596433 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
21, 2008).
101. David Priebe, Piling On: The Reemergence of the Parallel Derivative Lawsuit as the
Federal Securities Class Action Window Closes, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1999, at 333, 335
(PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1136, 1999); see also William S.
Freeman, The Securities Class-and-Derivative Litigation Two-Step, 13 ASS’N OF BUS. TRIAL
LAW. REP. 1 (2004) (“The securities litigation two-step—a federal class action followed closely
by a remarkably similar state derivative complaint—is now commonplace.”).
102. See Petition for Review at 9, Ellison v. Superior Court of the State of Cal., No.
S128367, 2004 WL 3080563 (Cal. Oct. 8, 2004) (internal quotation omitted). Ellison also
claimed that “Silicon Valley companies, in particular, have seen a recent flurry of derivative
suits that use federal class actions as a springboard to allege fraud and insider trading” and
that “[i]t has gotten to the point that a federal securities fraud action now almost inevitably
will be accompanied by a parallel derivative lawsuit.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted).
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Derivative plaintiffs typically use two approaches to turn federal
securities claims into the basis of a derivative claim. First, as noted
above, many plaintiffs allege a federal securities claim directly,
alleging that the corporation was injured by an officer or director’s
false or misleading statements. Second, many plaintiffs use so-
called Caremark103 or other good faith claims to turn federal
securities claims into state fiduciary duty claims. In a Caremark
claim, the shareholder typically alleges that the board breached its
fiduciary duty by failing to exercise proper oversight over the
plaintiff corporation.104 For example, the plaintiff in a securities
class action may allege that the corporation and its officers and
directors violated the federal securities laws by lying to the market.
The plaintiff in a parallel derivative suit can then take this same
allegation and assert that the officers and directors breached their
fiduciary duty to the corporation by causing the corporation to make
false statements or by causing the underlying financial problems
resulting from the misstatements. More than 90 percent of the
public company suits in my study involved Caremark claims or
related allegations that the defendants failed to exercise proper
oversight over the affairs of the corporation.105 
This phenomenon is more apparent in federal derivative suits
than in state derivative suits. In Robert Thompson and Randall
Thomas’s study of derivative suits filed in the Delaware Court of
Chancery, they found that only 7 percent of the public company
suits included allegations of false or misleading statements.106
Moreover, only 26 percent of the suits included allegations of an
improper financial record or a Caremark claim.107 The cases in their
study were much more likely to include allegations of self-dealing
103. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(holding that a board of directors has a good faith duty to assure that the company utilizes
an information and reporting system to keep directors informed about corporate activities).
104. See id. at 971.
105. This categorization was admittedly difficult because many of the complaints were not
models of clarity. Few of the complaints alleged a Caremark claim specifically. Reading
between the lines, however, it appeared that the plaintiffs were relying on the
Caremark/good faith line of cases, as shown by the lack of specific allegations of the board’s
wrongdoing, such as conflicts of interest or abuses of control, and the prevalence of
allegations regarding the board’s failure to supervise the financial affairs of the corporation.
106. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 3, at 1772.
107. See id.
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by corporate managers, leading them to conclude that “almost 60
percent of the complaints [in their study] raise principally a duty of
loyalty claim.”108 Such loyalty claims were far less frequent in my
study,109 suggesting that shareholders are more likely to file so-
called tagalong derivative suits in federal court, reserving state
court claims for more traditional duty of loyalty claims. 
The practice of filing tagalong derivative suits may well be a
reaction to the lead plaintiff provisions in the PSLRA.110 Prior to the
enactment of the PSLRA, it was common for shareholders to file a
significant number of nearly identical securities class actions.111
The PSLRA sought to halt this duplicative litigation by establishing
a procedure by which courts appoint one or more shareholders as
lead plaintiff(s) in a securities class action, thereby focusing the
litigation into a single case.112 This procedure closes out other
shareholders who may have been able to pursue their claims prior
to the enactment of the PSLRA. As my study shows, rather than
abandoning their litigation efforts, many shareholders—and their
attorneys—are now channeling their efforts into derivative suits.
This may be a fairly new phenomenon. Following the enactment
of the PSLRA, shareholders tried to get around the Act by filing
state law securities class actions.113 Congress quickly determined
that these state suits were “frustrat[ing] the objectives of the
[PSLRA]”114 and enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Stan-
dards Act of 1998, or SLUSA.115 SLUSA preempts a significant
number of securities class actions filed under state law, preventing
108. Id. at 1773. 
109. For example, only 10 of the classic public company derivative suits (9.9 percent)
involved an alleged conflict of interest other than insider trading, whereas 29 of the private
company suits (70.7 percent) involved such allegations. 
110. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
111. See Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J.
2053, 2061-64 (1995).
112. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (2006).
113. See Richard A. Rosen, The Statutory Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements
After Two and a Half Years: Has it Changed the Law? Has it Achieved What Congress
Intended?, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 645, 671-72 (1998).
114. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2, 112
Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (congressional findings).
115. Id.
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shareholders from using these claims as a backdoor around the
PSLRA.116 Congress, however, did not use its preemption power to
bar derivative suits,117 even though these suits also often mirror the
allegations in a securities class action. The end result of these
statutory enactments is that Congress has drastically limited the
ability of shareholders to file securities class actions—whether
under federal or state law—but left intact their ability to file
derivative suits. It is therefore not surprising that many sharehold-
ers are filing derivative suits that look quite similar to federal
securities class actions.
My study revealed far fewer similarities between private
company derivative suits and federal securities class actions.
Instead, the private company suits looked more like typical
business disputes. More than half involved allegations by a
minority shareholder that a controlling shareholder had engaged in
oppression or abuse of control.118 Many of these cases also reflected
struggles for control over the plaintiff corporations,119 or claims that
the individual defendants failed to comply with specific state
requirements, such as quorum rules for meetings or the filing of
particular corporate documents.120
In addition, few of the private company derivative suits included
any of the traditional markers of securities fraud claims. Fewer
than 5 percent of the suits included section 10(b) claims or allega-
116. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b)-(c) (2006).
117. See id. § 77p(f)(2)(B).
118. Specifically, 23 of the 41 private company suits (56.0 percent) involved allegations of
oppression and/or abuse of control. In contrast, only 9 of the public company suits (6.4
percent) included such allegations. A note about methodology is important here. Nearly all
of the complaints—both public and private—included counts alleging oppression and/or abuse
of control. These counts, however, rarely reflected the allegations made in the complaint.
Specifically, when one examined the allegations, they did not include any of the typical
hallmarks of an oppression claim, such as exclusion from management, withholding of
dividends, paying excessive salaries to majority shareholders, and similar actions. See, e.g.,
Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257, 267-68 (S.C. 2001) (describing
the “classic situation” of minority shareholder oppression, often referred to as “freeze out”).
Accordingly, rather than categorizing every complaint with an allegation of oppression as an
oppression case, I looked at the specific allegations included in the complaint to determine
whether they encompassed key emblems of oppression and abuse of control.
119. Fourteen of these suits (34 percent) involved a struggle for control of the company.
120. Seven of the suits (17.1 percent) involved a claim that a specific action by the
company was invalid.
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tions of insider trading, and fewer than 15 percent of the suits
alleged that the plaintiff company made misrepresentations in its
financial documents.
This analysis reveals that derivative suit complaints in federal
court fall into two camps. The public company suits bear a striking
resemblance to securities class actions, with shareholders alleging
that the defendants caused the corporation to violate accounting
rules or mislead its investors. The private company suits, on the
other hand, follow a different mold, reflecting more traditional
business disputes or allegations of oppression. As both types of suits
progress beyond the pleading stage, however, derivative plaintiffs
face common procedural hurdles that distinguish all derivative
suits from their securities law counterparts.
C. Procedural Hurdles in Derivative Suits
In shareholder litigation, the filing of the complaint typically
unleashes a wave of procedural battles. In securities class actions,
these battles revolve around the adequacy of the plaintiffs’ allega-
tions. Federal law demands that shareholders in securities class
actions satisfy an increasing array of pleading requirements that
prevent approximately 45 percent of plaintiffs from having their
day in court.121 State law has chosen a different approach. Rather
than heightening pleading requirements, states have enacted
various procedural hurdles that allow the plaintiff corporation’s
board of directors to regain control over the litigation. My study
explored the impact of the two primary procedural hurdles in
derivative suits: the demand requirement and the special litigation
committee. 
1. Demand in the Federal Courts
The demand requirement is the first and most significant hurdle
in a derivative suit. Prior to filing suit, the derivative plaintiff must
121. Stephanie Plancich & Svetlana Starykh, 2008 Trends in Securities Class Actions,
NERA ECON. CONSULTING, Dec. 2008, at 7, available at http://www.nera.com/image/PUB_
Recent_Trends_Report_1208.pdf.
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make a demand on the corporation’s board of directors, requesting
that the board itself file the suit. As the Delaware Supreme Court
held, this requirement reflects the “cardinal precept” of corporate
law that “directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business
and affairs of the corporation.”122 As long as the board of directors
is composed of a majority of independent directors, it should decide
whether the corporation should initiate litigation.123
In federal court, a mix of federal and state law governs the
demand requirement. Under Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, plaintiffs must allege with particularity “any effort by
the plaintiff to obtain the desired action from the directors or
comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or
members.”124 The U.S. Supreme Court held that this rule estab-
lishes only the procedural constraints underlying the demand
requirement and does not establish substantive demand require-
ments.125 Accordingly, state law governs when a derivative plaintiff
in federal court is required to serve a demand on a corporate board
prior to filing suit.126
Nearly all states require derivative plaintiffs to make a presuit
demand upon the corporation.127 Many states, however, waive this
122. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
123. In re Consumers Power Co. Derivative Litig., 132 F.R.D. 455, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1990)
(“Whether to sue or not to sue is ordinarily a matter for the business judgment of directors,
just as is the decision that the corporation will make bricks instead of bottles.”) (internal
quotations omitted).
124. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3)(A). 
125. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1990) (holding that Rule 23.1
“does not create a demand requirement of any particular dimension ... [i]n order to determine
whether the demand requirement may be excused by futility in a derivative action founded
on § 20(a) of the [Investment Company Act of 1940], we must identify the source and content
of the substantive law that defines the demand requirement in such a suit”).
126. See id. at 108 (“The scope of the demand requirement under state law clearly
regulates the allocation of corporate governing powers between the directors and individual
shareholders.”).
127. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 626(c) (1983) (“In any [shareholders’ derivative]
action, the complaint shall set forth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff to secure the
initiation of such action by the board.”); TEX. CODE ANN. § 21.553 (Vernon 2008) (“A
shareholder may not institute a derivative proceeding until the 91st day after the date a
written demand is filed with the corporation.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-672.1(B) (2008) (“No
shareholders may commence a derivative proceeding until ... [a] written demand has been
made to the corporation to take suitable action.”); see also infra note 135 and accompanying
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requirement if the derivative plaintiff alleges with particularity
that the demand would have been futile, typically because a
majority of the board could not have considered the demand in an
impartial manner.128 If the derivative plaintiff does not allege
futility and instead makes a presuit demand on the board and the
board rejects the demand (as it almost always does), the court will
review the board’s decision under the highly-deferential business
judgment rule.129 Accordingly, in jurisdictions that recognize
demand futility, there is a strong incentive for plaintiffs to forgo
demand and place all their chips on a futility defense. A number of
states, however, have followed the lead of the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act in imposing a universal demand require-
ment.130 This requirement mandates that plaintiffs make a demand
in all cases, eliminating the futility defense and (so the hope goes)
the accompanying litigation. 
My study examined how these different rules play out in practice.
To address the impact of the demand requirement, I first examined
the percentage of cases in which the plaintiff made a presuit
demand. I excluded nine cases filed on behalf of foreign corporations
because the demand rules were unclear in these foreign jurisdic-
tions. Out of the 173 remaining cases, the derivative plaintiff made
a presuit demand in 36 of the cases, or 20.8 percent. Put another
way, despite the demand requirements adopted in nearly every
state, the derivative plaintiff did not make a presuit demand in
nearly 80 percent of the cases.
text.
128. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); In re Guidant S’holders Derivative Litig., 841
N.E.2d 571, 576 (Ind. 2008).
129. Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 212 (Del. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Brehm
v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
130. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (2003). This study counted the following states as
universal demand jurisdictions: Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. In
Texas, the relevant statute recognizes a futility exception only in derivative suits filed on
behalf of closely held corporations. See TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14(L) (Vernon 2003).
All of the Texas companies in my study are public, and I accordingly coded them all as
universal demand cases.
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The vast majority of the cases were governed by law that
recognized a futility exception to the demand requirement. This is
not surprising given that 98 of the plaintiff corporations in my
study (53.2 percent) were incorporated in Delaware, and Delaware
has long recognized a futility exception.131 Of the 24 cases subject
to a universal demand requirement, the derivative plaintiff
complied with this requirement in only 13 of the cases, or 54
percent of the universal demand cases, a figure that indicates that
universal demand requirements do not necessarily lead to universal
demands. 
On the other hand, universal demand requirements do increase
the likelihood of a presuit demand. Of the 149 cases not subject to
a universal demand requirement, the derivative plaintiff made a
demand in only 23 of the cases, or 15.4 percent. This data suggests
that universal demand requirements greatly increase the number
of cases in which the board has an opportunity to take control of the
suit on the front end. Even in universal demand jurisdictions,
however, this opportunity is never guaranteed. 
Nor do universal demand requirements eliminate litigation fights
over demand. In the eleven universal demand cases in which the
derivative plaintiff did not make a presuit demand, the defendants
filed a motion to dismiss on this basis in five of the cases, or just
under half. It is impossible to draw definitive conclusions from this
small sample, but it is interesting to note that overall, demand was
an issue of contention in more than 20 percent of the universal
demand cases—the same cases in which demand was not supposed
to be a subject of dispute. The court ruled on four of these motions
and dismissed three cases on this basis.132
Universal demand requirements may not eliminate litigation
over demand, but they certainly do reduce it. In the cases not
subject to a universal demand requirement, the defendants moved
to dismiss in more than half of those in which the derivative
plaintiff did not make a presuit demand. Although several suits
131. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 808.
132. In the fourth case, the court acknowledged that the applicable state law did not
recognize a futility defense, but held that demand was excused under a different exception
to the demand requirement. See Nedler v. Vaisberg, 427 F. Supp. 2d 563, 571, 573 (E.D. Pa.
2006).
1784 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1749
settled or were voluntarily dismissed while the motion was pending,
the court dismissed nearly 80 percent of the cases (22 out of 28) in
which it ruled on this issue. Couched more broadly, however, these
figures also show that only 25 out of the 182 cases in this study
(13.7 percent) were dismissed because the plaintiff failed to make
a presuit demand. Another five cases were dismissed because the
plaintiff made a presuit demand, but the board rejected the
plaintiff’s demand and this decision was protected by the business
judgment rule or the plaintiff did not give the board sufficient time
to consider the demand.
These findings highlight the curious role of demand requirements
in federal derivative suits. Parties spend significant time and
money fighting over the issue, but in the end, relatively few cases
turn on it. Interestingly, a similar point can be made about the
other key procedural hurdle in derivative suits—special litigation
committees. 
2. Special Litigation Committees
Derivative plaintiffs who prevail on the issue of demand face yet
another procedural hurdle. All fifty states allow the plaintiff
corporation to appoint a committee of independent directors, called
a special litigation committee or SLC, to review the allegations in
a derivative complaint and determine whether the suit is in the
best interests of the corporation.133 If the SLC determines that the
suit is not in the plaintiff corporation’s best interests, it will
recommend that the court stay or dismiss the suit.134 If the SLC
determines that the suit is in the plaintiff corporation’s best
interests, it will typically recommend that the SLC take control of
the suit and pursue redress against the individual defendants.135
133. See 2 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8:25, at 8-146 (Supp. 2002); DAN K. WEBB ET AL.,
CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS § 3.03[d], at 3-54 (2009).
134. See WEBB ET AL., supra note 133, § 3.03[d], at 3-54.
135. See id.
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Despite scholarly interest in SLC decision making,136 the
conventional wisdom is that SLC decisions are rare and that, in
those few instances in which an SLC does reach a decision, the
decision is predictably in favor of the plaintiff corporation.137
Indeed, Robert Thompson and Randall Thomas’s study of derivative
suits filed in Delaware state court found only a few cases in which
the plaintiff corporation utilized an SLC and only one case in which
an SLC made a recommendation that led to dismissal of the suit.138
Other research has challenged this finding, with one recent study
concluding that SLCs may be more likely to recommend that the
plaintiff corporation pursue or settle derivative claims than prior
research has recognized.139
My study found that a relatively high number of plaintiff
corporations formed an SLC, but that few of these SLCs issued a
report and even fewer cases were dismissed on the basis of such a
report. In my study, the plaintiff corporation formed an SLC in 41
of the 182 total cases in the study (22.5 percent).140 Nearly all of
these suits involved public companies, suggesting that SLCs are not
significant players in private company suits. The SLCs, however,
issued a report or similar document in only 17 of these cases (41.4
percent). These 17 cases produced a total of 13 reports because a
few cases involved the same corporation and a single report.141 In
136. See, e.g., Minor Myers, The Decisions of the Corporate Special Litigation Committees:
An Empirical Investigation, 84 IND. L.J. 1309 (2009); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias,
Special Litigation Committees, and the Vagaries of Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. REV.
1305 (2005); Lawton W. Hawkins, Exchange-Enhanced Special Litigation Committees:
Enforcing Fiduciary Duties Amid a Crisis of Trust, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 587.
137. See, e.g., 2 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.10 cmt. d (1994) (“Commentators have emphasized that a consistent
pattern has surrounded the use of the special litigation committee: once such a committee
is formed to review the merits of the litigation, the outcome of the process is generally a
foregone conclusion—namely, dismissal of the action is recommended against all
defendants.”). 
138. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 3, at 1781.
139. See Myers, supra note 136, at 1311.
140. This is a conservative estimate because it only includes cases in which an SLC is
mentioned in the case filings. There may be many more cases in which the plaintiff
corporation formed an SLC, but did not inform the court that it had done so.
141. There were two instances in which a single report was filed in three separate,
nonconsolidated cases filed on behalf of the same corporation. As an aside, the SLCs in my
study were relatively small, ranging in size from one to nine committee members. The
median number of committee members was two. 
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142. See, e.g., Notice of Motion and Motion by the Special Litigation Committee of KLA-
Tencor’s Board of Directors, (A) to Terminate and Dismiss the Amended Consolidated
Complaint, and (B) to Approve Settlements With Certain Individuals at 1, In re KLA-Tencor
Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 5:06-cv-03445, 2008 WL 1907583 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25,
2008); UnitedHealth Group Inc. Report of the Special Litigation Committee at 60, 63, In re
UnitedHealth Group Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 0:06-cv-01216-JMR-FLN, 2007 WL
4298730 (D. Minn. Dec. 6, 2007); Report of the Special Litigation Committee of the Board of
Directors of Rambus, Inc. at 1-2, In re Rambus, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 5:06-cv-03513-JF
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Rambus Special Committee Report].
143. See, e.g., Rambus Special Committee Report, supra note 142, at 18 (“[T]he Company
... is subject to a pending shareholder class action ... asserting federal securities fraud claims.
The Company’s interest in the securities fraud action[ ] will not be well served by providing
the Company’s litigation opponents with a substantial amount of work product generated by
the SLC’s counsel. Accordingly, this report states the SLC’s conclusions.... It does not,
however, set forth the specific factual findings that led the SLC to these conclusions.”);
Report of the Special Litigation Committee of Nominal Defendant Take-Two Interactive
Software, Inc. at 88, St. Clair Shores Gen. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Eibeler, No. 06-cv-0688
(MBM) (HBP) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2007) (recommending dismissal of all claims based on the
legal merits of the claims and “the expense and attendant disruption to the Company’s
management that continued pursuit of such claims would necessarily entail”).
144. See, e.g., UnitedHealth Group Inc. Report of The Special Litigation Committee, supra
note 142, at 59-60 (“Although the SLC concluded that some of the claims against Dr. McGuire
may have merit, it also considered the costs and risks attendant to protracted ongoing
litigation against him ... [including] the disruption of, and distraction from, the ongoing
business of the Company as a result of litigation against its former Chief Executive Officers;
the significant costs that the Company would bear in connection with such litigation; and Dr.
the remaining 24 cases, the case either settled or was dismissed
before the SLC issued its report. 
By and large, the SLCs in my study recommended dismissal of
the claims. In the 17 cases in which an SLC issued a report and
recommendation, the SLC recommended pursuing claims against
one defendant in only one of the cases. In three cases, the SLC
recommended settling with one or more individual defendants.142
In all of the cases, the SLC recommended dismissing the claims
against at least one (and usually more than one) defendant. The
SLCs gave fairly predictable grounds for their recommendations,
ranging from the legal merits of the claims to the distraction of key
personnel, the impact of the derivative suit on parallel litigation,
and the costs of pursuing the claims.143 Interestingly, several SLCs
did conclude that individual defendants engaged in wrongdoing,
especially in the stock option cases, but concluded that pursuing the
suit was nonetheless not in the best interests of the plaintiff
corporation because of the cost or negative publicity of litigation.144
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Although the plaintiff corporation filed a motion to dismiss on the
basis of the SLC’s recommendation in all seventeen cases, the court
ruled on the motion in only six of these cases. In the remaining
cases, the parties settled prior to a ruling on the SLC’s recommen-
dation or the court dismissed the case on other grounds. In the six
cases in which the court ruled on the recommendation, the court
granted the motion and dismissed the case in five cases. In the
sixth case, the court denied the motion, holding that one of the two
SLC members was not independent.
In short, the two procedural hurdles discussed here—the demand
requirement and special litigation committees—were major sources
of battle for many parties in my study. Less than 20 percent of the
cases, however, were dismissed as a result of these two hurdles.145
The larger question remains: what was the resolution of the
remaining derivative suits in the study?
D. Four Paths to Resolution
Scholars and commentators have long criticized derivative suits
as nuisance or strike suits.146 The data is now available to test this
criticism. Put simply, the key question is whether derivative suits
benefit plaintiff corporations. If the evidence indicates that
derivative suits do benefit plaintiff corporations, these suits can
take their rightful place as a valuable tool in corporate governance.
On the other hand, if the criticism is justified, then the time has
McGuire’s potential rights to advancement of fees and indemnification by the Company.”).
145. Of course, SLCs can benefit plaintiff corporations even if the case is not dismissed on
the basis of the SLC report. SLCs typically conduct an investigation of the allegations in the
complaint, and this investigation can be beneficial even if the case settles or is dismissed
before the SLC files its report. Additionally, the SLC process itself may facilitate settlement
simply because it presents the risk (in the eyes of derivative plaintiffs) that the SLC will
issue a report concluding that the suit is not in the best interests of the corporation. 
146. See, e.g., Thompson & Thomas, supra note 3, at 1758 (explaining that the different
incentives of plaintiff corporation and the attorneys “have created the possibility of strike
suits or, as they are sometimes called, nuisance suits”); Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit:
A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit and the Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV.
355, 357 (1994) (“Traditionally, the debate over frivolous shareholder suits has focused to a
large extent on the shareholder derivative suit rather than on direct shareholder actions.”);
Sarah Wells, Maintaining Standing in a Shareholder Derivative Action, 38 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 343, 349 (2004) (arguing that courts presiding over derivative suits “are concerned with
thwarting potential strike suits to blackmail the corporation”).
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come to re-evaluate the role of derivative suits in corporate law.
Nearly all of the suits in my study (170 out of 182, or 93.4 percent)
have been resolved.147 These suits ended in one of four ways:
(1) judgment, (2) involuntary dismissal, (3) voluntary dismissal, or
(4) settlement. This Section explores the resolution of these cases
with an eye toward assessing the continued role of derivative suits
in corporate law. 
1. Judgment
Only two suits in the study ended with a judgment favorable to
the plaintiff corporation, and both suits were filed on behalf of
private corporations. In the first suit, the derivative plaintiffs sued
on behalf of Plaintiffs’ Shareholders Corporation, a corporation that
was formed pursuant to an earlier securities class action settlement
involving Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co. (Southern
Life).148 The sole defendant in the derivative suit was Southern Life,
which was alleged to have made false and misleading statements
to the plaintiff corporation in connection with the purchase of an
investment vehicle.149 Following an eight-day trial, the jury con-
cluded that Southern Life had violated the federal securities laws
and awarded $31.7 million to the plaintiff corporation, a verdict
that the district court upheld.150 This was the only trial in my study,
reflecting the larger phenomenon of the “vanishing trial” in the U.S.
judicial system.151
The second case involved a derivative suit filed on behalf of a
small private corporation named Pipeanium Technologies, Inc.152
The sole defendant in the suit was Pipeanium’s president and sole
147. Many of these cases appear to have been abandoned or have been stayed for years
pending resolution of a parallel securities class action or other lawsuit. Others are in
discovery or other pre-trial proceeding.
148. See Class Action Complaint at 2-3, Badger v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., No. 6:06-
cv-637 (M.D. Fla. May 11, 2006). 
149. See id. at 2.
150. See Plaintiffs’ Motion to Alter or Amend the Final Judgment for the Imposition of
Prejudgment Interest and Incorporated Memorandum of Law at 2, Badger, No. 6:06-cv-637.
151. See generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).
152. Third Amended Complaint, Brown v. Pownall, No. 05-0496 (D. Nev. Oct. 31, 2006).
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director, who allegedly converted corporate funds for his own
personal use and then fled to Canada.153 After the defendant failed
to respond to the complaint, the court entered a default judgment
in favor of the individual shareholders personally, not in favor of
the plaintiff corporation.154
Thus, two suits in my sample ended with the vindication of the
plaintiffs’ claims, although the plaintiff corporation only received
compensation in one. None of the 141 public company suits in my
study went to trial or ended with a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
corporation. Accordingly, any value in these suits must come from
other types of resolution.
2. Involuntary Dismissals
An additional 43 percent of the resolved suits (73 out of 170) in
my study were involuntarily dismissed by the court.155 These
involuntary dismissals almost always turned on procedural
grounds, rather than the merits of the derivative plaintiff’s claims.
As stated above, 25 of the derivative suits (14.7 percent of the
resolved suits) were dismissed because the plaintiff failed to make
a presuit demand on the board of the plaintiff corporation. An
additional five suits were dismissed because the board rejected the
derivative plaintiff’s demand or the derivative plaintiff did not wait
the appropriate time after making a demand before filing suit. Five
suits were dismissed on the basis of an SLC report.
An additional 36 suits were dismissed for other procedural
reasons156:
• 12 suits were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction;157
153. Id. at 4, 8-13.
154. Such direct recovery by shareholders is not unprecedented. See Thompson & Thomas,
supra note 3, at 1777 (noting that “[d]erivative litigation has long provided for direct recovery
within a derivative suit”). 
155. This Section refers to the ultimate termination of the suit. I have not included
procedural rulings when the case continued after the derivative plaintiff filed an amended
complaint. 
156. A small number of suits were dismissed on multiple grounds. 
157. In several cases, the derivative plaintiff attempted to get into federal court by
alleging a claim under § 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. In many of these cases, the
court held that there was no private right of action under § 304 and then declined to exercise
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• 9 cases were dismissed when the derivative plaintiff did not
have or lost standing, generally because of a merger or sale of
the plaintiff corporation;
• 8 cases were stayed or dismissed when the plaintiff corporation
filed for bankruptcy;
• 6 cases were dismissed for lack of prosecution;
• 1 case was dismissed because the court determined that the
derivative plaintiff was not an adequate representative of the
plaintiff corporation.158 
A far smaller percentage of the cases (4.8 percent, or 8 cases) was
dismissed because the court found fatal deficiencies in the substan-
tive legal merits of the claims.
These dismissal rates are similar to the dismissal rates in
securities class actions,159 but are much higher than the comparable
figures in civil litigation more generally. According to data from the
Federal Judicial Center, less than 20 percent of federal civil cases
nationwide end with an involuntary dismissal.160 The data from the
Federal Judicial Center are older than the data in my study,161 but
they reflect more than thirty years of federal litigation between
1970 and 2001. Over this thirty year period, the rate of involuntary
dismissals ranged between the most recent low of approximately 17
percent to a high in the early 1980s of approximately 24 percent.162
Notably, during this entire period, the involuntary dismissal rate
never rose above 25 percent.163
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims. The plaintiffs may have re-filed these
suits in state court. Records of state court suits are not available on PACER and were outside
the scope of my study. 
158. Rule 23.1(a) provides that “[t]he derivative action may not be maintained if it appears
that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of shareholders or
members who are similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a). 
159. See supra note 102.
160. Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial
Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases,
1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 720 fig.5 (2004).
161. Hadfield’s analysis of the Federal Judicial Center’s data examined involuntary
dismissal rates between 1970 and 2001. See id. Due to missing data, she was unable to
examine data between 1971 and 1979. See id. at 710.
162. See id. at 720 fig.5.
163. See id.
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Do these figures indicate that derivative suits are less meritori-
ous than the average civil case in federal court? Perhaps not, given
that nearly all of the derivative suit dismissals were on procedural
grounds. The judges in these cases did not conclude that the
allegations lacked merit. They simply concluded that the derivative
plaintiffs could not overcome the steep procedural hurdles in
derivative suits. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how these
suits benefitted the plaintiff corporations. In many of these suits,
the corporations likely paid significant legal fees and devoted
managerial resources to litigate a case that ultimately provided no
tangible benefit to the corporation.164
A note of caution is appropriate here. The involuntary dismissal
data, along with the voluntary dismissal data below, present a
compelling case that derivative suits are broken. This does not
mean that the underlying claims lacked merit or that corporate
managers do not engage in misconduct. Certainly there are cases in
which officers and directors violate their fiduciary duties. The goal
of this Article is to examine whether derivative suits are operating
as an effective mechanism to enforce these duties. An involuntary
dismissal rate that is more than twice as high as the rate in civil
litigation generally suggests that they are not. 
3. Voluntary Dismissals 
The next category—voluntary dismissals—inspires even less
confidence in derivative suits. Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure permits a plaintiff to dismiss a suit without court
approval by filing a notice or stipulation of dismissal.165 In essence,
a voluntary dismissal is a dismissal as a result of the plaintiff
simply walking away from the case. One-quarter of the suits in my
study were voluntarily dismissed by the derivative plaintiff.166 More
164. It is possible that the mere filing of the derivative suits provides some benefit, even
if the suits end with no tangible relief. I discuss this possibility below in Part III.C.
165. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1). 
166. Specifically, 42 out of the 170 resolved suits (24.7 percent) were voluntarily
dismissed. In a number of additional cases, the plaintiff filed a notice of dismissal after the
plaintiff corporation filed for bankruptcy, the court dismissed the claims, or the claim was
revealed to be legally deficient in some fatal way (such as a lack of standing after the plaintiff
corporation merged). In these instances, I classified the case as an involuntary dismissal
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of the private company suits (29.7 percent) were voluntarily
dismissed than the public company suits (23.3 percent).167 
Once again, these percentages are far higher than in civil
litigation more generally. According to data from the Federal
Judicial Center, slightly more than 10 percent of all federal civil
cases are voluntarily dismissed every year, a figure that has held
fairly steady since the early 1990s.168 Accordingly, while relatively
few civil plaintiffs abandon their lawsuits, one-quarter of derivative
plaintiffs do so. 
This phenomenon is disturbing for two reasons. First and
foremost, it is difficult to see how a derivative suit that is volun-
tarily dismissed benefits the plaintiff corporation. This is especially
true when the voluntary dismissal comes after protracted litigation
—as many of the dismissals in my study did—forcing the plaintiff
corporation to spend considerable time and money participating in
the litigation only to see the suit come to a sudden end.169 Moreover,
voluntary dismissals likely erode the deterrent power of derivative
suits, contributing to the already widespread belief among corpo-
rate officers and directors that these suits are nothing more than
strike suits. 
Second, many of the voluntary dismissals violated Rule 23.1 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 23.1(c) provides that “[a]
derivative action may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compro-
mised only with the court’s approval. Notice of a proposed settle-
ment, voluntary dismissal, or compromise must be given to
shareholders or members in the manner that the court orders.”170
rather than a voluntary dismissal. In addition, I did not code a case as a voluntary dismissal
where claims against only a few defendants were voluntarily dismissed, if the rest of the suit
continued.
167. It is difficult to determine whether these plaintiffs refiled their suits in another court
or whether other plaintiffs pursued similar claims elsewhere. As discussed above, PACER
is not searchable, and therefore it is difficult to track related litigation through the federal
judicial system. 
168. Hadfield, supra note 160, at 721 fig.6.
169. See infra Part II.D.4.b for a discussion of the plaintiff corporation’s costs in a
derivative suit. 
170. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(c) (emphasis added). Rule 23.1 was amended in 2007 as part of
the stylistic amendments to the federal rules. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 advisory committee’s notes
(2008). The prior version of the rule stated that a derivative suit “shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or
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The rule contemplates that the judge will order briefing regarding
the merits of the dismissal followed by a hearing at which share-
holders opposed to the dismissal can challenge it.171 This rule is
designed to prevent collusive settlements cloaked as dismissals
when, for example, the individual defendants pay the attorneys for
the derivative plaintiff to dismiss the suit without any benefit going
to the plaintiff corporation.172 
Only two cases in my study (4.8 percent of the voluntary
dismissals) complied with the mandate of this rule.173 In many of
the remaining cases, the parties simply submitted a short notice of
voluntary dismissal and the court dismissed the case without
further inquiry or analysis.174 In seven of these cases, the court
agreed with the parties—typically without any written analysis—
that notice and hearing were not necessary.
Did these voluntary dismissals mask settlements that should
have been subject to judicial scrutiny? In approximately 40 percent
of the voluntary dismissals (18 out of 42) the parties represented to
the court that they would bear their own attorneys’ fees and costs,
suggesting (although certainly not conclusively) that the parties did
not secretly settle the suit.175 Many of the remaining suits, however,
compromise shall be given to shareholders or members in such manners as the court directs.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (2005). This amendment did not make any substantive changes to the
rule.
171. 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1839, at 197-99
(3d ed. 2007).
172. See id. at 195-96.
173. Interestingly, Robert Garber filed both cases. Garber is the shareholder discussed
earlier who filed more than twenty-five derivative suits and who the court determined to be
“appallingly ignorant of the many derivative actions that have been filed in his name.” See
supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. In both cases, Mr. Garber decided, after months
or even years of litigation, that he no longer wanted to pursue the litigation. See
Memorandum of Law in Support of Unopposed Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Action at
1, In re Avon Prods., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05-6803 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2009); Order Regarding
Dismissal of Action at 1, Garber v. Paulson, No. 05-9327 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2008). In one
case, this decision followed the court’s expression of skepticism regarding Mr. Garber’s
litigation history and an order that he be deposed to determine “his qualifications to
maintain th[e] action ..., the history of his involvement in this litigation, and the history of
his relationship with the Robbins Umeda & Fink law firm.” Order, supra, at 1-2.
174. In a few additional cases, the parties asked the court to waive the notice and hearing
requirements because they were not warranted in the particular case (for example, because
all of the shareholders were before the court). 
175. Such a representation does not guarantee that the parties did not settle the suits
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because the defendants could have paid the settlement and the derivative plaintiff could have
then used this money to pay its fees and other costs.
176. The voluntary dismissals in my study came anywhere between two to forty-nine
months after the filing of the complaint. The median length of the suits that were voluntarily
dismissed was eleven months.
177. I have included two settlements in the category that have obtained preliminary, but
not final, approval from the court as well as two settlements that (at the time this Article
went to press) had been submitted to the court but had not received preliminary or final
approval. The notice and hearing process can take several months, and it is rare for judges
to reject a settlement proposed by the parties. Accordingly, I have included these settlements
to get a more complete view of settlements in derivative suits. It is obviously possible,
although unlikely, that these settlements will change. 
trigger more suspicion. In these cases, the parties filed a joint notice
of dismissal simply informing the court that the case had ended,
often after protracted and heated litigation.176 The derivative
plaintiffs in these cases may have decided not to pursue suits that
they realized they could not win. Yet it is unlikely that all of these
plaintiffs would simply walk away from ongoing litigation that they
had previously fiercely contested, suggesting that at least some of
these dismissals were actually settlements. Regardless of whether
they settled or just dismissed the cases, however, the parties did
not comply with the mandate of Rule 23.1.
This analysis returns full circle to the question with which we
began: do federal derivative suits have merit? As we have seen,
nearly 70 percent of the resolved cases in my study ended with an
involuntary or voluntary dismissal—resolutions that do not provide
any significant tangible benefit to the plaintiff corporations. Aside
from the two private company cases that ended with a favorable
judgment for the plaintiff corporation, any value from derivative
suits will have to come from the last category of case resolution, the
settlements.
4. Settlements
Approximately 30 percent of the resolved cases in my study—53
out of 170 cases—ended with a settlement.177 This percentage is far
less than the percentage of settled suits in civil litigation more
generally. A recent study by Theodore Eisenberg and Charlotte
Lanvers found that approximately 67 percent of federal civil suits
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settle.178 Eisenberg and Lanvers limited their study to two federal
district courts,179 but this disparity again raises difficult questions
about the benefits of derivative suits. As Eisenberg and Lanvers
note, settlement is the “most common successful outcome for
plaintiffs,”180 and the low settlement rate in derivative suits,
coupled with the lack of trials or other favorable judgments, means
that relatively few derivative suits lead to a successful outcome for
the plaintiff corporation.181
The 53 settlements in my study include 11 private company
settlements and 42 public company settlements. These two
categories of settlements differ to such an extent that it makes
sense to address each category separately to draw broader conclu-
sions about the role of derivative suits in the public and private
spheres.
a. Private Company Settlements
The private company settlements raise the same Rule 23.1
concerns described above, albeit with a small sample size. Eight of
the eleven cases settled without the parties providing the courts
with any information about the settlements. Rule 23.1 requires
court approval of settlements in derivative suits and contemplates
that the court will conduct a careful review of the settlements prior
to approving them.182 The significant number of cases that did not
follow this procedure, this time in the settlement context, further
illustrates that parties in the federal courts are often ignoring the
constraints of the federal rules—and that judges are letting them.
On the other hand, the fear of collusion may not have been
significant in these cases. Private companies tend to have a smaller
number of shareholders who are more likely to be involved in the
corporation’s day-to-day management. Given this watchful eye, it
is less likely that a few shareholders could reach a collusive
178. Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 12, at 115.
179. Id. at 111.
180. Id. at 112.
181. Of course, as discussed above, the actual settlement rate may be higher than 30
percent if some of the voluntary dismissals discussed above are actually settlements.
182. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; see also supra notes 170-75.
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183. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1.
184. See Joint Motion for Stipulated Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff on Count One and
Dismissal of All Other Claims, Fleet Dev. Ventures, LLC v. Brisker, Case No. 3:06-cv-0570
(D. Conn. Nov. 3, 2008).
185. See Amended Order, Nedler v. Vaisberg, No. 05-cv-2976 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2008);
Stipulated Consent Order, Nedler v. Vaisberg, No. 05-cv-2976 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2008).
186. See, e.g., Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of
Minority Shareholder Oppression in the Close Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1207, 1217 (2009)
(explaining that the plight of minority shareholders in close corporations turns on the
“critical fact” that these shareholders have no exit strategy). 
187. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement and
For a Fairness Hearing, Johnson v. Couturier, No. 2:05 cv-02046 RRB GGH LE.D.Cal. (E.D.
Cal. Jan. 5, 2010).
settlement with the individual defendants at the expense of the
plaintiff corporations. Nonetheless, Rule 23.1 does not create any
exceptions for settlements in private companies, nor is there any
guarantee that these settlements benefitted the plaintiff com-
panies.183
The parties provided the court with information about the
settlements in only three of the private company cases. None of
these settlements involved the payment of money to the plaintiff
corporation. In the first suit, the parties agreed to appoint a
receiver to manage the plaintiff corporation.184 In the second suit,
the settlement agreement required the plaintiff corporation to buy
the shares of the derivative plaintiffs.185 This settlement obviously
benefitted the derivative plaintiffs, who were able to escape the
difficulties of a minority position in a closely held corporation.186
The settlement also may have benefitted the plaintiff corporation
by allowing it to rid itself of divisive shareholders and move forward
with a more united shareholder vision for the corporation. In the
final suit, one plaintiff in a larger ERISA case brought derivative
claims, and the suit ended with a portion of the settlement funds
going to settle a Department of Labor suit, with the remaining
money distributed to ESOP participants and beneficiaries.187 
We can put the settlement figures together with the figures from
the previous sections to obtain a broader picture of derivative suits
brought on behalf of private companies. Of the 41 suits filed on
behalf of private companies, 2 suits (4.9 percent) ended with a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff corporation or its shareholders.
Thirteen suits (31.7 percent) ended with an involuntary dismissal,
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while another 11 suits (26.8 percent) ended with the derivative
plaintiff voluntarily dismissing the suit. As discussed above, given
the litigants’ failure to comply with Rule 23.1, it is impossible to
know whether the voluntary dismissals were actually settlements
or if the derivative plaintiffs simply dropped the suits. Another 11
suits (26.8 percent) settled, but 8 of these settlements did not
comply with Rule 23.1 and accordingly no information is available
about these suits either. Four suits (9.8 percent) are still pending.
Table 1 provides the outcome of the private company suits in my
study.
Table 1: Outcome of Private Company 
Derivative Suits
 Outcome   Number of Suits (Percent) 
 Favorable Judgments  2 (4.9%) 
 Involuntary Dismissals  13 (31.7%) 
 Settlements  11 (26.8%) 
 Voluntary Dismissals  11 (26.8%) 
 Still Pending  4 (9.8%) 
 Total  41 suits 
In short, given the lack of compliance with Rule 23.1, not much
information is available about private company suits. My study
does not reveal many documented benefits for the plaintiff compa-
nies in these suits, but these benefits may simply be hidden in
private settlements. Greater compliance with Rule 23.1 would
provide more information about these suits, in addition to promot-
ing the goal, inherent in the rule itself, of protecting the interests
of plaintiff corporations and their shareholders. 
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b. Public Company Settlements
Far more information is available about the public company suits
in my study. Overall, 42 of the 141 public company suits (29.8
percent) settled. Sixty of the public company suits (42.6 percent)
were involuntarily dismissed. Another 31 suits (22 percent) were
voluntarily dismissed. Only 8 suits (5.7 percent) are still pending.
As Table 2 demonstrates, the classic suits in my study fared worse
than the stock option suits.
Table 2: Outcome of Public Company
Derivative Suits
  Outcome   Classic Suits   Stock Option     Suits
All Public      
Company Suits
 Involuntary
 Dismissals  48 (48%)  12 (30%)  60 (43%) 
 Voluntary
 Dismissals  23 (23%)  8 (20%)  31 (22%) 
 Settlements  25 (25%)  17 (43%)  42 (30%) 
 Still  
 Pending  5 (5%)  3 (7.5%)  8 (5.7%) 
 Total  101  40  141 
Nearly all of the public company settlements fell into three
categories: (1) money, (2) corporate governance reforms, or (3) a
combination of the two.188 Only 4 settlements (9.5 percent of the
settlements) involved the payment of money to the plaintiff
corporation, without any accompanying corporate governance
reforms. The settlements in 18 suits (42.9 percent) included the
188. Three of the 42 public company settlements did not fall into these categories, either
because the parties did not provide the court with any information regarding the settlements
or because the derivative claims were simply folded into the settlement of parallel claims,
resulting in no independent relief for the plaintiff corporation.
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payment of money or other financial consideration, as well as
corporate governance reforms. In another 17 suits (40.5 percent),
the only consideration for the settlement was corporate governance
reforms.
The most promising settlements, in terms of value for the
plaintiff corporations, are the 22 settlements with a financial
component. Yet even these settlements often did not involve the
payment of cash to the plaintiff corporation. In fact, the plaintiff
corporation only received a cash payment in 13 of these
settlements.189 The defendants in many of these cases made
substantial payments, often totaling several million dollars.190 In
the derivative suit arising out of the stock options backdating
scandal at Affiliated Computer Services, for example, the company
received $30 million in cash from the individual defendants’
insurance company.191 In the derivative suit filed on behalf of Apple
Inc., the defendants’ insurance company agreed to pay a lump sum
of $14 million to settle the derivative suit, $5.15 million of which
went to Apple itself.192 The remaining $8.85 million went to the
plaintiffs’ attorneys.193 Importantly, however, 12 of the 13 cases in
which the plaintiff corporation received a cash payment were stock
option cases, or cases in which the derivative plaintiff alleged that
the defendants had backdated stock options. Only 1 of the 101 suits
that I have termed classic derivative suits involved a cash payment
to the plaintiff corporation.194
189. Stated differently, the plaintiff corporation received cash in 9.2 percent of the public
company suits. In a few additional cases, the defendants agreed to relinquish a severance
package or other nominal benefits. 
190. These cash payments often consisted of repayment of improperly priced stock options.
191. See Unopposed Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement at 1-2, 6, In re
Affiliated Computer Servs. Derivative Litig., No. 06-1110 (N.D. Tex. May 6, 2009).
192. Apple Officers Settle Shareholders Suits for $14 Million, REUTERS, Sept. 10, 2008,
available at www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USN1049004420080910.
193. Id.
194. This case is In re Escala Group, Inc. Derivative Litigation, No. 1:06-cv-03902
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2008). Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the plaintiff corporation
received $3.5 million from the insurer of the defendant directors and officers and an
additional $2 million from a defendant accounting firm. See Stipulation of Settlement at 11-
12, In re Escala Group, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 1:06-cv-03902, AKH (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10,
2008). Even in this case, however, it does not appear that the plaintiff corporation was able
to keep the money. The settlement of the derivative suit was part of a global settlement that
included settlement of a securities class action in which the corporation agreed to pay $10
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million in cash and stock to the class, far more than it received from the defendants in the
derivative suit. See Escala Group, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 1 (May 30, 2008).
195. Nine cases included both the payment of cash to the plaintiff corporation and the
forfeiture and/or repricing of stock options. 
196. See Margaret Cronin Fisk & Avram Goldstein, UnitedHealth's Former Chief To
Repay $600 Million, BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 6, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=20601087&refer=home&sid=a.lhETzJe3CQ.
197. See Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement at 28-33, In re DHB Indus., Inc.
Derivative Litig., No. 05-4396(JS) (ETB) (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2006). The settlement in this case
was part of a global settlement that included settlement of a securities class action. The class
cash part of the settlement was $34.9 million, the derivative cash portion of the settlement
was $300,000, all of which was paid to the derivative plaintiffs’ attorney. The settlement also
included various corporate governance reforms.
Additionally, 13 of the financial settlements included the re-
pricing or forfeiture of stock options by the individual defendants,
either in addition to or instead of direct cash payments.195 Although
the individual defendants did not have to write a check in these
cases, these cases often had significant estimated value to the
plaintiff corporations. In the derivative suit filed on behalf of
UnitedHealth Group, Inc., for example, the parties estimated that
the value of the repriced and cancelled stock options was approxi-
mately $900 million, making it the largest settlement ever in a
derivative suit.196 In the other cases, the estimated value of the re-
priced or cancelled options was much smaller, but several exceeded
$10 million. Not surprisingly, all of these settlements occurred in
cases involving the alleged backdating of stock options. 
The benefits of the derivative suits are more attenuated in
examining the six financial settlements that included neither an
outright payment of cash to the plaintiff corporation nor the
repricing or cancellation of stock options. The financial component
in these cases fell into one or both of the following categories. In one
case, the plaintiff corporation received a cash payment from its
insurance company, but had to turn around and pay this entire
amount to the attorneys for the derivative plaintiffs.197 Although the
corporation nominally received a financial benefit, the attorneys
were the only ones who ended up with money in their pockets. 
In other cases, the settlement agreement purported to place
limitations on the amount of money that the plaintiff corporations
would have to pay in parallel litigation in which they were the
defendants or included payment of insurance funds to settle
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parallel litigation. These cases generally involved the global
settlement of multiple claims arising out of the same underlying
events, and the purported value of the derivative claims was to
limit or eliminate the corporation’s contribution to the settlement
of a securities class action.
Again, the value of these settlements is open to debate. Although
it is certainly in the corporation’s interest to minimize its contribu-
tion to these settlements, it is not clear that the corporation’s
contribution would have been different but for the existence of the
derivative suit. Insurance funding of settlements in securities class
actions is the norm,198 and therefore corporations typically do not
have to pay anything toward these settlements, even without the
filing of parallel derivative suits. The insurance companies likely
would have had to pay the same exact amount regardless of
whether they agreed to do so as part of a parallel settlement in a
derivative suit. It is possible that these derivative suits allowed the
corporations to tap into additional insurance funds,199 but the
parties did not make this claim in their briefs filed with the court
198. See, e.g., Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and
Officers’ Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 760-61 (2009)
(“Virtually all U.S. public corporations buy D&O insurance, and the vast majority of
securities claims settle within or just above the limits of the defendant corporation's D&O
coverage.”).
199. D&O Insurers Fund $118 Million Partial Settlement of Broadcom Options Backdating
Derivative Suit, The D&O Diary, http://www.dandodiary.com/2009/09/articles/options-
backdating/do-insurers-fund-118-million-partial-settlement-of-broadcom-options-backdating-
derivative-suit/ (Sept. 1, 2009) (explaining how the filing of a derivative suit on behalf of
Broadcom allowed the company to access additional insurance funds).
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in support of the settlements.200 In sum, the financial benefits of
these settlements was likely minimal at best.201 
Putting these data together, a total of 18 out of 42 settlements
(42.9 percent) in the public company cases included a meaningful
financial component—typically a direct cash payment to the corpo-
ration and/or the repricing or cancellation of stock options. There
were additional cases in which the attorneys received money or the
filing of the derivative suit ostensibly lowered the corporation’s
contribution in other litigation, but only 18 cases involved a
meaningful and tangible financial gain for the plaintiff corpo-
ration.202 Sixteen of these 18 cases were stock option cases.
Accordingly, 40 percent of the stock option cases ended with the
200. For example, in a derivative suit filed on behalf of Bally Technologies, Inc., the
settlement provided that the only monetary component of the settlement was an agreement
that “the Company would only make a limited contribution of Company assets towards the
settlement of the Securities Class Actions, [while as] a further and far more substantial part
of this Settlement, the Individual Defendants and Bally have agreed to cause $14.25 million
of available Director and Officer Insurance policies to be utilized for the settlement of the
Securities Class Actions.” Stipulation of Settlement at ¶ 2.1, Longbine v. Miodunski, No. 06-
cv-00373-LDG-RJJ (D. Nev. May 15, 2007) [hereinafter Longbine Stipulation of Settlement].
In the brief in support of the settlement, as well as in the accompanying affidavit, the
derivative plaintiff only mentions this component of the settlement briefly, focusing far more
on the corporate governance aspects of the settlement. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Motion for Approval of Settlment and Award of Attorneys’ Fees
and Expenses, Longbine v. Miodunski, No. 06-cv-00373 (D. Nev. Aug. 1, 2007); see also
Stipulation of Settlement at 6, In re R&G Fin. Corp. Derivative Litig., No. 05-cv-5547
(S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2008) (providing that, as the monetary component of the settlement of the
derivative suit filed on behalf of R&G Financial Corp., the company’s D&O insurance carrier
would pay the company $2.7 million to settle the derivative suit with the parties
“acknowledg[ing] that [the company] intend[ed] to contribute that ... amount ... toward the
settlement fund to be established in the Class Action”).
201. The same cannot necessarily be said for a global settlement in one of the stock option
suits in which the individual defendants agreed to contribute to the settlement of the
securities class action, as occurred in two of the cases in my sample. See Amended
Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement at 11, Gunther v. Tomasetta, No. 2:06-cv-02529-
R(CTx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2007); Stipulation and Agreement of Partial Settlement at 23, In
re Doral Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig. No. 1:05-md-01706-JSR (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2007). A derivative
suit may have an impact in causing individuals, as opposed to insurance companies, to agree
to pay their fair share toward parallel litigation. Accordingly, this case was coded as
providing a meaningful financial benefit. 
202. It is obviously difficult to draw a line between meaningful and nonmeaningful
components in settlements. At the end of the day, however, it is difficult to see how plaintiff
corporations benefit from payments that they never see and agreements by insurance
companies to pay what they likely had to pay anyway. 
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203. I am not weighing this financial gain against the costs of the suits. It is possible that
the corporations spent more than their multimillion dollar recovery to litigate the suit,
especially considering that the corporations are often required to indemnify the defendants
for all of their legal expenses. 
204. The two classic derivative suits that arguably ended with a meaningful financial
benefit were In re Escala Group, Inc. Derivative Litigation and In re Doral Financial Corp.
Securities Litigation. See supra notes 194 and 201 and accompanying text. In neither case,
however, was the company’s financial gain in the derivative suit larger than its payment in
the parallel securities class action.
plaintiff corporation obtaining a meaningful financial benefit.203
In contrast, only 2 of the 101 (2 percent) classic derivative suits, or
suits that do not involve allegations of backdated stock options,
involved a meaningful financial benefit.204
One key metric for measuring the merit of derivative suits is the
value returned to the plaintiff corporations. Using this metric,
several of the stock option suits in my study benefitted the plaintiff
corporations, either because the plaintiff corporation received a
cash payment or because the plaintiff corporation was able to cancel
or reprice improperly granted stock options. Far fewer of the classic
derivative suits returned value, at least if value is measured as
money in the bank for the plaintiff corporation. 
Indeed, in reading the settlement agreements in these classic
derivative suits, it is clear that money was not the point of the
settlements. Corporate governance reform was the point. The figure
below compares the number of settlements in my study that include
meaningful financial components with the number of settlements
that include corporate governance components.
Figure 4
Settlements with Meaningful
Financial Components
Settlements with Corporate
Governance Components
• 2 of the classic settlements
• 16 of the stock option set-
tlements
• A total of 18 settlements,
or 13.5 percent of the
resolved public com-
pany cases
• 21 of the classic settle-
ments
• 14 of the stock option set-
tlements
• A total of 35 settlements,
or 26.3 percent of the
resolved public com-
pany cases
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As this figure illustrates, corporate governance settlements are
far more common in federal derivative suits than financial settle-
ments, especially when it comes to the classic derivative suits. This
fact leads to a crucial point about the value of derivative suits.
Aside from the relatively few settlements in which the plaintiff
corporation received a financial payment, the value of federal
derivative suits turns largely on the merits of corporate governance
settlements. The next Part analyzes the merits of these settlements
directly. Before turning to this analysis, however, it is important to
understand the specifics of these settlements, as well as their costs.
In general, these corporate governance settlements included a
relatively uniform list of reforms. No settlement agreement in-
cluded all of the reforms listed below, but the similarity of the
reforms included in the agreements was nonetheless striking (for
reasons discussed below in Part III). These reforms included:
• A rule requiring a majority or more of the directors to meet
existing or enhanced independence requirements (17 settle-
ments);
• A requirement that the board or certain committees of the
board meet regularly in executive sessions (15 settlements);
• An agreement to appoint, or enhance the duties of, a lead
independent director (14 settlements);
• The addition of one or more independent directors to the board
(14 settlements);
• A policy allowing the board and/or its committees to hire
advisors (13 settlements); 
• A limitation on the number of boards on which the directors
can serve (12 settlements);205
• A requirement that directors attend a certain percentage of
board, committee, or shareholder meetings (14 settlements);
• A requirement or recommendation that the board adopt a
“clawback” provision, or a provision requiring executive officers
to repay bonuses or other monies in the event of a restatement
of the company’s financial statements (11 settlements); and
205. These settlement agreements specified that the directors could serve on between one
and six additional boards, with a median number of three. 
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• A provision allowing major shareholders to nominate candi-
dates for the corporation’s board of directors (9 settlements).
In most of the suits, the plaintiff corporation agreed to maintain
these reforms for a set number of years, typically between two and
five years.
Before turning to a closer examination of the benefits of these
settlements, it is important to understand their costs. Derivative
suits are not cheap for plaintiff corporations. First, the corporation
has to hire lawyers to represent the corporation’s interests in the
litigation. Second, the corporation often has to pay the legal bills of
its officers and directors pursuant to indemnification agreements.206
Third, as explained above, corporations often form a special liti-
gation committee to investigate the allegations in the suit.207 The
cost of forming such a committee can dwarf the other expenses in
the litigation because SLCs typically hire a law firm with no
connection to the case to ensure the firm’s independence, and the
law firm then commences a full-blown investigation, complete with
extensive document review and interviews of dozens of people close
to the alleged events.208 Fourth, the corporation incurs additional
indirect costs when its key personnel have to divert attention from
other corporate duties to assist with the litigation. These costs can
be considerable, especially given that my study found that, on
average, more than six law firms were involved in each lawsuit.209 
These expenses alone are considerable, but in nearly all of the
settlements in my study, the corporation also agreed to pay the
expenses of the derivative plaintiffs’ attorneys. It is generally
accepted that courts can order plaintiff corporations to pay the
attorneys’ fees of derivative plaintiffs as long as the suit confers a
206. Indemnification is typically mandatory if the defendants are successful in the lawsuit.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 145(c) (2009). States also allow corporations to enter into
indemnification agreements with their officers and directors, permitting indemnification in
cases of settlements or even judgments against these individuals as long as the defendants
have not acted contrary to a statutory standard of conduct. See, e.g., id. § 145(b). It is
common for corporations to indemnify their officers and directors to the full extent permitted
by law (and for officers and directors to insist on such protection prior to agreeing to serve). 
207. See supra text accompanying note 133.
208. See WEBB ET AL., supra note 133, § 3.03[d] at 3-54, 55.
209. Twenty-nine of the public company suits involved ten or more law firms, and six
involved twenty or more. 
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substantial benefit on the corporation, even if the benefit is
nonpecuniary.210 Accordingly, courts are permitted to award
attorneys’ fees in cases in which the sole consideration for the
settlement is corporate governance reforms.211 In most of the public
company settlements in my study, the parties agreed on these fees
in the settlement agreement. The attorneys’ fees were significant,
ranging from a low of $60,000 to a high of $29.7 million.212 The
median fee amount was slightly less than $1 million. 
These fees depended in large part on the consideration in the
settlement. In the cases in which the corporation received a
meaningful financial benefit, the median attorneys’ fees were $6.65
million. In the cases in which the only consideration for the
settlement was the reform of corporate governance policies, the
median fees were a fraction of this amount at $460,000.213 
In the end, therefore, we return to the same question with which
we began. Do derivative suits benefit the corporations on whose
behalf the suits are brought? The vast majority of the suits do not.
Nearly 70 percent of the resolved suits in the study were dismissed,
leaving the corporation without any remedy for the alleged mis-
conduct. Nearly all of the remaining 30 percent settled. A relatively
small number of settlements include meaningful financial compo-
nents that appear to benefit the plaintiff corporation, although the
cost-benefit analysis is less clear when costly attorneys’ and other
210. See Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 395 (1970) (holding that “a corporation
may receive a ‘substantial benefit’ from a derivative suit, justifying an award of counsel fees,
regardless of whether the benefit is pecuniary in nature”); Kaplan v. Rand, 192 F.3d 60, 70-
72 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that courts can award attorneys’ fees based on corporate
governance settlements as long as the reforms in these settlements provide “substantial
benefit” to the plaintiff corporation and are not simply “illusory” or “superficial”); In re Nvidia
Corp. Derivative Litig., No. C-06-06110-SBA (JCS), 2008 WL 5382544, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
22, 2008) (approving an award for attorneys’ fees in connection with a settlement comprised
largely of corporate governance reforms because “strong corporate governance is
fundamental to the economic well-being and success of a corporation”).
211. See, e.g., In re Rambus Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 06-3513 JF (HRL), 2009 WL 166689,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2009) (stating that “courts consistently have approved attorneys’
fees and expenses in shareholder actions where the plaintiffs’ efforts resulted in significant
corporate governance reforms but no monetary relief”). 
212. These figures include both fees and costs for the derivative plaintiffs’ attorneys, as
many settlement agreements do not break out these amounts. 
213. The fees exceeded $1 million in several suits, including one suit where the fees were
nearly $7.5 million.
2010]   CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COURTROOM 1807
fees are added to the mix. Far more settlements, however, did not
involve meaningful financial components and were instead based on
promises by the plaintiff corporation to reform aspects of its
corporate governance practices coupled with significant attorneys’
fees. Accordingly, before we can decide whether derivative suits
enhance corporate value, we must turn to the final piece of the
puzzle—whether corporate governance settlements enhance cor-
porate value.
III. ASSESSING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COURTROOM
We have now seen that the value of derivative suits depends in
large part on the value of corporate governance settlements.
Despite the importance of these settlements, legal scholars have not
studied them at all. This Part establishes a conceptual framework
to evaluate these settlements, a framework that examines corpo-
rate governance settlements from three angles. First, it addresses
whether these settlements provide redress for plaintiff corporations,
exploring the link between the specific reforms in the settlements
and the misconduct alleged in the litigation.214 Second, it analyzes
whether these settlements are effective in reforming corporate
governance more broadly, an analysis that draws on empirical
studies from business and finance literature.215 Third, it examines
whether these settlements deter future misconduct by corporate
managers, building on scholarship that argues that deterrence,
rather than compensation, should be the goal of representative
litigation.216 This analysis is intended to lay the foundation in an
area of the law ripe for further scholarly inquiry.
A. The Promise of Redress
There is no perfect way to determine whether corporate gover-
nance settlements benefit the plaintiff corporations in derivative
suits, because, unlike traditional settlements, no money changes
214. See infra Part III.A.
215. See infra Part III.B.
216. See infra Part III.C.
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217. See, e.g., In re Apple Computer, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. C 06-4128 JF (HRL), 2008
WL 4820784, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2008) (stating that plaintiffs’ expert estimated that
value of various corporate governance “reforms could increase Apple’s market value by an
amount well in excess of several hundred million dollars”); Unite Nat’l Ret. Fund v. Watts,
No. Civ.A. 04CV3603DMC, 2005 WL 2877899, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2005) (noting that
plaintiffs’ expert Robert Monks estimated that various governance reforms were worth not
less than $2.3 billion).
hands in these settlements. Corporate governance experts occasion-
ally try to place a monetary value on governance reforms,217 but
such calculations are necessarily difficult and imprecise. After all,
the value of these reforms lies in the hope that they will prevent
future instances of corporate misconduct, and there is no looking
glass to determine whether such reforms will be effective.
If we cannot measure the value of these settlements directly, we
may be able to do so indirectly. One way to measure the benefits of
corporate governance settlements is to examine the link between
the alleged misconduct and the specific reforms included in the
settlement agreement. Lawsuits typically arise from specific
problems, and the remedies typically relate to these problems. If the
alleged misconduct in a derivative suit resulted from poor internal
controls, for example, and the settlement strengthens these internal
controls, then at least on its face, the settlement has the potential
to benefit the plaintiff corporation. 
In reviewing the settlement agreements, however, it was striking
how few of the reforms responded directly to the allegations in the
complaint. The analysis here is necessarily qualitative because the
link between harms and benefits is difficult to measure with any
precision. Few derivative plaintiffs used these settlements to
remedy the particular misconduct that gave rise to the litigation.
Instead, a considerable number of the reforms exhibited a tenuous
link to the allegations, perhaps improving more general corporate
governance at the corporation, but not addressing the specific
problem that gave rise to the suit. 
The clearest links to the alleged misconduct were in the settle-
ments in the stock option suits. In nearly all of these settlements,
the plaintiff corporation agreed to adopt detailed and often ex-
tensive reforms to improve the procedures relating to the granting
of stock options. In the derivative suit filed on behalf of Infosonics
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Corp., for example, the company agreed that its outside counsel
would be involved in all grants of stock options, that the company
would ask its outside auditor to identify the stock option granting
process as a high risk audit item, and that any future stock option
plans would clearly state the exercise price, grant date, and fair
market value.218 Several other agreements in stock option suits
include similar provisions.219 
Additionally, several settlement agreements included specific
provisions to address accounting irregularities alleged in the
litigation. In the derivative suit filed on behalf of Bally Technolo-
gies, Inc., for instance, the shareholders alleged that the company
was using improper revenue recognition policies to boost its
earnings.220 As part of the settlement, the company agreed to
improve these policies, specifying, for example, that the Chief
Executive Officer and the Chief Financial Officer would be responsi-
ble for maintaining the policy, that the board would review the
policy, and that any disputes about the policy would be decided by
the Audit Committee.221 Other settlements also included specific
reforms to remedy the specific problems identified in the complaint,
including the termination of particular individuals alleged to have
participated in the misconduct,222 hiring of additional staff in
departments with poor performance,223 or strengthening of insider
trading policies.224 
Even in these cases, however, the benefits to the plaintiff
corporations were not always clear. The cases involving the alleged
backdating of stock options are a good example. As noted above,
218. See Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement at 9, In re Infosonics Corp. Derivative
Litig., No. 06-cv-1336 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2008).
219. See, e.g., Stipulation of Settlement at 11-12, In re Marvell Techs. Ltd. Derivative
Litig., No. C-06-03894-RMW(RS) (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Marvell Stipulation
of Settlement]; Stipulation of Settlement at 12-14, In re Sanmina-SCI Derivative Litig., No.
C-06-03783-JF (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2009). 
220. Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint at 41, Longbine v. Miodunski, No. 2:06-cv-
373 (D. Nev. Mar. 27, 2006).
221. Longbine Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 200, Ex. B. ¶ 2.
222. See, e.g., Marvell Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 219, at 10-11.
223. See, e.g., Stipulation of Settlement at Ex. B, In re General Motors Corp. Derivative
Litig., No. 06-1749 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 18, 2008).
224. See, e.g., Stipulation of Settlement at 11-12, Green Meadows v. Impac Mortgage
Holdings, No. SAVC 06-0091 CJC(RBNx) (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2007).
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nearly all of the settlements in these cases involved an agreement
by the plaintiff corporation to modify its procedures for awarding or
repricing stock options—a specific solution to a specific problem.225
Yet it seems unlikely that these corporations would have repeated
their past mistakes even in the absence of such an agreement. The
scandal concerning backdated stock options spent months on the
front pages of the Wall Street Journal and other national newspa-
pers,226 and several top executives have faced criminal charges.227
Many of these same companies were investigated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission and subjected to lengthy internal
investigations.228 Just as importantly, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 changed the relevant accounting rules, making the backdating
of stock options much less likely.229 The spotlight on this practice
makes it exceedingly unlikely that any of these companies will turn
around and backdate stock options again, especially in the two to
five year time period covered by these settlements. 
A similar point can be made about the cases in which the
derivative claims arose out of a specific accounting error. In these
cases, the plaintiff corporation often had to restate its earnings and
may have been subject to an internal investigation and/or a
Securities and Exchange Commission investigation.230 Under these
225. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 36.
227. See First Backdating Conviction Brings Prison Term and $15 Million Fine, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2008, at C2 (reporting that former Chief Executive Officer of Brocade
Communications Systems was sentenced to twenty-one months in prison, although this
conviction has since been overturned); Former Take-Two Official Is Sentenced in Backdating
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2007, at C3 (reporting that former Take-Two general counsel was
sentenced to three years probation).
228. At least 31 of the 40 companies named in the stock option suits (77.5 percent) were
also investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission, and nearly all conducted
internal investigations. 
229. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a)(2)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(2)(c) (2006)
(requiring corporations to report all high-level executive stock option grants and exercises
within two business days). 
230. See, e.g., Second Amended Shareholder Complaint, In re Apple Inc. Derivative Litig.,
No. 06-cv-4128-JF, 2007 WL 4936967 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2007) (alleging that Apple had
backdated its stock options, resulting in a restatement of approximately $105 million, as well
as investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission); Verified Shareholder
Derivative Complaint for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Abuse of Control, Gross Management,
Waste of Corporate Assets, and Unjust Enrichment, In re HCA, Inc. Derivative Litig., No.
3:05-cv-0968 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 20, 2005) (alleging that HCA, Inc. made various accounting
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circumstances, it is likely that the corporation will be especially
cognizant of the relevant rule in the future and will take care not to
violate it again, even without the mandated reforms of a legal
settlement. Accordingly, even in cases in which there is a clear link
between the alleged harm and the reforms in the settlement, the
value to the corporation is not always clear.
Many more provisions in the settlement agreements, however,
were not tailored to the specific problems alleged in the complaint.
Indeed, there was often a striking disconnect between the alleged
problems and the reforms in the settlement agreements. In several
suits that did not involve allegations of stock option backdating, for
example, the settlement agreements included promises by the
plaintiff corporation not to reprice or backdate stock options. For
instance, the derivative plaintiff in one suit alleged that the
defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the plaintiff corpora-
tion by approving various related-party transactions that were not
in the corporation’s best interests.231 In the settlement, however, the
plaintiff corporation agreed to a number of reforms that had little
to do with such related-party transactions, including a promise that
the corporation would not reprice previously issued stock options
without the approval of the independent directors.232 This provision
likely reflected the fact that stock option backdating was on the
front pages of the newspapers at that time, even if there were no
allegations that a particular corporation had backdated options. Put
simply, the agreement was not a specific solution to a specific
problem; it was a specific solution to someone else’s problem. 
Moreover, as detailed above in Part II, there was remarkable
uniformity in the types of reforms included in the settlement
agreements. For example, twelve of the settlement agreements
included provisions limiting the number of corporate boards on
which the directors of the plaintiff corporations can serve. None of
the complaints in these cases alleged that the underlying wrongdo-
ing stemmed from the directors in question serving on too many
errors that later led to an insider trading investigation of various HCA executives by the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice).
231. See Stipulation and Agreement of Compromise, Settlement, and Release at 2,
Beitchman v. Aduddell, No. 5:05-cv-01465 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 7, 2007).
232. See id. at 6.
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boards, and yet, in twelve separate cases, the parties agreed that
this particular reform would benefit the plaintiff corporation.
Similarly, thirteen of the settlements required the plaintiff cor-
porations to allow their boards or board committees to hire
advisors. Again, there were no allegations in these cases that the
underlying harm was caused by the board being unable to hire
advisors, and yet, the parties in more than a dozen cases decided
that this reform was appropriate.
At first glance, such uniformity is puzzling. Across the country,
in different suits involving different types of allegations, parties are
sitting down at the negotiating table and agreeing to a fairly
common set of reforms, many of which are unrelated to the alleged
wrongdoing in their particular cases. What accounts for this
phenomenon?
One possible answer is that these reforms are part of a larger
movement by activist investors to reform corporate governance.
Investors are demanding these reforms at the negotiating table
because these are the reforms that they want corporations to adopt
more generally. Although shareholders as a group are notoriously
passive,233 a distinct group of shareholders are much more active
and attempt to use their power to improve the way that corpora-
tions are governed. These shareholders, many of whom are public
pension or retirement funds, have articulated a fairly consistent set
of corporate governance goals—“best practices”—that include
increasing the independence of corporate boards and improving the
monitoring function of these boards.
Over the last several years, it has become apparent that there are
few avenues for these activist investors to promote their reforms.
Shareholders can join together and use their collective power to
replace the board of a troubled company, but few institutional
investors want to take on the challenges of running a public
company.234 Shareholders have also tried to reform corporate
233. See, e.g., Arnoud W.A. Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, Monitoring Corporate
Performance: The Role of Objectivity, Proximity, and Adaptability in Corporate Governance,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 356, 362 (2004); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined,
89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 523 (1990).
234. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 3, at 1789 (noting that institutional investors
“show little inclination to become directors or to offer names of those who are willing to
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governance through shareholder proposals, or proposals for reform
that shareholders can place directly on the company’s proxy
statement.235 Shareholder proposals have limited effectiveness in
transforming corporate governance, however, because many have
low success rates and the votes ordinarily are not binding on a
corporation’s board of directors.236
In the face of these difficulties, it is not surprising that activist
investors have turned to litigation to reform corporate governance.
Indeed, a 2001 article in Forbes magazine exhorted “Shareholders
Of The World: Sue!”237 A top plaintiffs’ law firm touts that “a ...
revolution” has begun in litigation across the country and that the
resulting settlements “have begun the essential reform of making
directors truly accountable to shareholders.”238 In a study of
institutional investors by James Cox and Randall Thomas, several
institutional investors stated that an important benefit of getting
involved in shareholder litigation was the potential to reform
corporate governance.239 According to their study, “[t]hese institu-
tions wanted to ‘change the system’ and therefore were willing to
expend the extra time and effort to become involved.”240 Corporate
governance reform has moved into the courtroom, and corporate
governance settlements are the current battleground for these
reform efforts.
This shift is evident in a comparison of the reforms that activist
shareholders promote with the reforms in the settlements in my
study. The most obvious example are shareholder efforts to enhance
director independence. Many institutional shareholders support
efforts to increase the number of independent directors on corporate
boards, believing that a board that includes a significant percentage
serve”).
235. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2009).
236. See id. § 240.14a-8(i)(1); RISKMETRICS GROUP, 2008 POSTSEASON REPORT SUMMARY
3 fig.1 (2008) (on file with author), available at http://www.riskmetrics.com/docs/2008
postseason_review_summary (click “Download”; then create free account and log in).
237. Geoffrey Colvin, Shareholders Of The World: Sue!, FORTUNE MAG., Mar. 19, 2001, at
50.
238. Richard Bennett, A Quiet Revolution, http://www.csgrr.com/csgrr-cgi-bin/mil?templ
=news/articles/quiet_revolution.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
239. Cox & Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter?, supra note 14, at 1600-01.
240. See id. at 1601.
1814 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1749
of independent directors will be less beholden to management and
thus better able to serve as a check on management.241 RiskMetrics
Group, an influential company that advises institutional investors
on proxy voting,242 devotes several pages of its policy guide to the
question of independence, laying out detailed requirements that
directors must meet to qualify as independent and recommending
that shareholders support proposals to split the CEO and Chairman
positions.243 Similarly, the Council of Institutional Investors
recommends that at least two-thirds of the directors on a board
should be independent and that the board should be chaired by an
independent director.244 Independence is also a core component of
the policy guidelines of the most prominent institutional investors,
from CalPERS245 to TIAA-CREF.246
Consistent with this focus, nearly all of the corporate governance
settlements in my study included provisions strengthening or
upholding the independence of the plaintiff corporation’s board of
directors. For example, twenty of the settlement agreements
241. See Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 447
(2008).
242. Wachtell Lipton has said that “[b]ecause many institutional investors strictly adhere
to [RiskMetrics’] recommendations, public companies are obliged to take note of the updated
recommendations.” David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Corporate Governance Update:
RiskMetrics Update Continues To Hamper Director Discretion, Jan. 22, 2009, http://blogs.law.
harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2009/02/riskmetrics-update-continues-to-hamper-director-
discretion.pdf. 
243. RiskMetrics Group, U.S. Corporate Governance Policy: 2009 Updates 11 (2008),
available at http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/RMG2009PolicyUpdateUnited
States.pdf.
244. THE COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICIES §§ 2.3,
2.5d at 3-4 (2008), available at http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/council%20policies/CII%20
Corp%20Gov%20Policies%204-11-08.pdf [hereinafter COUNCIL POLICIES]. The Council of
Institutional Investors is an association of public, union, and corporate pension funds that
advises these funds on corporate governance issues.
245. CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, GLOBAL PRINCIPLES OF
ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 10-11, 48-49 (2009), available at http://www.calpers-
governance.org/docs-sof/marketinitiatives/2009-04-01-corp-governance-pub20-final-glossy.pdf.
246. TIAA-CREF, POLICY STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 7-8 (2009), available
at http://www.tiaa-cref.org/pubs/pdf/governance_policy.pdf [hereinafter TIAA-CREF
PRINCIPLES]; see also CALIFORNIA STATE TEACHERS’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PROGRAM POLICIES 12 (2006) (on file with author); FIDELITY INVESTMENTS,
FIDELITY FUNDS’ PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES: MARCH 2009, http://personal.fidelity.com/
myfidelity/InsideFidelity/InvestExpertise/governance.shtml.tvsr (click on “Full Text of Proxy
Voting Guidelines”).
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included an agreement by the company to appoint or continue to
have a lead independent director or split the CEO and Chairman
positions. Seventeen of the settlement agreements included
provisions strengthening or maintaining the company’s definition
of independence. Fourteen of the agreements included provisions
requiring or encouraging the company to appoint one or more new
independent directors. 
Other reforms included in corporate governance settlements also
mirror the reform agenda of activist investors. For example, many
institutional investors have adopted policies mandating director
attendance at a minimum percentage of board or shareholder
meetings.247 Fourteen settlements in my study included similar
attendance policies. Many institutional investors want corporations
to adopt limitations on the number of boards on which their
directors can serve.248 Twelve settlements in my study included
such limitations. Many institutional investors want outside
directors to meet in executive session outside the presence of
management.249 Fifteen settlements in my study mandated or
encouraged the outside directors of the plaintiff corporations to
meet in executive session.
In short, many of the reforms included in corporate governance
settlements are not specific solutions to specific allegations of
misconduct. Instead, they are part of a larger movement to reform
corporate governance. This point, however, does not answer the
broader question of whether corporate governance settlements are
beneficial. Even if many provisions in these settlements do not
247. COUNCIL POLICIES, supra note 244, § 2.6c; TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF TEXAS,
PROXY VOTING POLICY 3 (2008), available at http://www.trs.state.tx.us/investments/
documents/proxy_voting_policy.pdf.
248. COUNCIL POLICIES, supra note 244, § 2.8; T. ROWE PRICE GROUP, INC., CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES 2 (2009), available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/
TROW/690856276x0x229862/7afb792d-a55c-490f-bb8d-c72dab07b9cf/Corporate_
Governance_Guidelines.pdf; JPMorgan Chase & Co., Corporate Governance Functions of the
Board, http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About-JPMC/corporate-governance-
principles.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
249. COUNCIL POLICIES, supra note 244, § 2.9c; TIAA-CREF PRINCIPLES, supra note 246,
at 11; LEGG MASON INC., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 4, 6 (2007), http://www.
leggmason.com/about/documents/corp_governance_principles.pdf; VANGUARD, OUR VIEWS ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, https://personal.vanguard.com/us/content/Home/WhyVanguard/
AboutVanguardCorpGovernPrinciplesContent.jsp (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
1816 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1749
address the specific problems alleged in the litigation, they may
nonetheless benefit the corporations by improving overall corporate
governance at these corporations. Accordingly, to assess the merits
of corporate governance settlements, we must analyze these
settlements more directly. 
B. The Limits of Reform
An analysis of the merits of corporate governance settlements
turns on whether the specific provisions in these settlements
benefit the plaintiff corporations. For example, settlements that
force corporations to overhaul flawed governance systems may well
benefit these corporations by reducing the likelihood of future
misconduct. The next question, therefore, is whether the reforms in
the settlement agreements are likely to improve the governance
practices more generally at the plaintiff corporations. This analysis
begins by evaluating the relevant reforms in light of empirical
studies in the business and finance literature that have examined
several key reforms included in corporate governance settlements. 
As discussed above, nearly all of the corporate governance
settlements in my study included provisions requiring corporations
to enhance the independence of their boards. Corporations agreed
in these settlements to add additional independent directors,
strengthen the company’s definition of independence, split the CEO
and Chairman positions, and/or appoint a lead independent
director. Put simply, one of the chief goals of many settlements in
my study was to make the boards of the plaintiff corporations more
independent. 
Turning to the empirical evidence, however, one wonders whether
all this effort was for naught. Business and finance scholars have
examined the relationship between independence and firm perfor-
mance from nearly every angle, and they have been unable to come
up with any empirical evidence linking board independence with
increased firm value. One prominent study, for example, concluded
that companies with a higher percentage of independent directors
“do not achieve improved profitability, and there are hints in our
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data that they perform worse than other firms.”250 Another study
concluded that “the addition of independent directors to a corporate
board is subject to both diminishing marginal increases and
absolute declines in relative performance.”251 A recent article
surveying the relevant literature concluded that “the decisive
balance of studies has found no relation between director independ-
ence and performance.”252 In short, these settlements are chasing
a goal that has already been debunked. 
A similar conclusion can be drawn about the twelve settlements
in my study that placed limitations on the number of outside boards
on which the board members of the plaintiff corporations could
serve. These provisions reflect the belief that board members can
better monitor the corporations for which they serve if their
attention is not divided between a large number of other director-
ships. Yet, the empirical evidence, though sparse, suggests that
such limitations do not enhance firm performance.253 A study by
Professors Ferris and Jagannathan conducted of more than 6000
firms concluded that “directors of firms with higher growth
opportunities tend to hold a greater number of directorships in spite
of the potential costs to the firm” and that the number of director-
ships is positively correlated with nearly every measure of firm
value, including market-to-book ratios, total assets, corporate
250. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence
and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 233 (2002).
251. Barry B. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Revolution Versus Evolution in Corporation
Law: The ALI's Project and the Independent Director, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 557, 573 (1984);
cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further
Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants, 55 STAN. L. REV. 885, 891 (2002); Benjamin
E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives
on Firm Performance, 20 FIN. MGMT. 101, 111 (1991).
252. Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1814 (2008); see also James D. Cox, The ALI, Institutionalization, and
Disclosure: The Quest for the Outside Director's Spine, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1233, 1239
(1993) (“Overall, studies have found no correlation between board composition and firm
performance.”). 
253. See Stephen P. Ferris & Murali Jagannathan, The Incidence and Determinants of
Multiple Corporate Directorships, 8 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 31, 32-35 (2001). Moreover, the
study found that multiple directorships were fairly rare, with only 12.9 percent of the
directors in the sample holding more than one board seat and only 4 percent of the directors
holding more than two board seats, suggesting that “arguments for restrictions on board
memberships may be a solution for a problem that does not exist.” Id. at 32, 34.
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operating performance, and return to equity.254 Once again, the
empirical evidence reveals no benefits for a provision commonly
found in corporate governance settlements. 
It is important to note that these studies focus on the relation-
ship between corporate governance and firm performance. The
studies do not measure whether the reforms reduce future occur-
rences of fraud, a separate metric of value to many shareholders. It
is possible, for example, that boards with a greater percentage of
independent directors do a better job of rooting out corporate
misconduct and, therefore, benefit corporations even if measures of
profit and other financial indicia remain unchanged. This theory
has not been tested, but it is also important to note that nearly all
of the public companies in my study are already subject to stringent
listing standards enacted by the national stock exchanges that
require board independence. Both the New York Stock Exchange
and the NASDAQ require boards of member companies to include
at least a majority of independent directors.255 The settlements in
my study are, therefore, premised on the theory that boards with a
slightly greater percentage of independent directors will be better
able to ferret out misconduct, a theory that is possible but empiri-
cally untested. 
Many of the other provisions in corporate governance settlements
have not been subject to empirical review. I could not locate any
studies examining, for example, whether board attendance policies
or requirements that boards meet in executive session enhance
corporate value. The lack of empirical evidence may again argue in
favor of caution at the negotiating table, but it also presents the
difficult question of how to assess the value of these provisions.
Even without this empirical backdrop, however, we may still be
able to assess the benefits of these provisions by examining whether
the provisions are likely to benefit the particular companies at
issue. 
For example, fourteen of the settlements in my study included
provisions requiring or encouraging directors to attend board and/or
254. See id. at 33.
255. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303.A01 (2004); NASDAQ, Inc., Manual, Rule
4350(c)(1) (2007).
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shareholder meetings. In a vacuum, these attendance policies make
sense. Many derivative suits are premised on a board’s failure to
prevent or remedy misconduct. If board members are at least
present during critical meetings, perhaps they will be more likely
to catch future misconduct. The problem with this theory, at least
as applied to the cases in my study, is that most of the corporations
that agreed to such provisions did not have attendance prob-
lems—the directors of these particular companies were already
attending meetings, at least according to the companies’ proxy
materials. It is hard to imagine how these plaintiff corporations
benefitted from settlements requiring them to do what they were
already doing. 
For example, in one derivative suit in my study, the plaintiff
corporation agreed as part of the settlement to amend its bylaws to
require directors to attend 75 percent of board meetings.256 Yet the
corporation’s proxy materials for the relevant years indicate that
the corporation’s directors already attended more than 75 percent
of board meetings in the several years prior to the settlement.257 In
numerous other cases in which the settlement agreements included
similar provisions, the corporations’ proxy materials made clear
that these corporations also did not have attendance problems or
were simply silent on the board’s attendance record. Overall, none
of the fourteen corporations that agreed to attendance policies had
a documented attendance problem.
Similarly, fifteen settlements in my study included provisions
requiring or encouraging the outside directors of the plaintiff
corporation to meet in executive session outside the presence of
management. I have not found any empirical data examining
whether executive sessions boost corporate value, but again, the
256. Stipulation and Agreement of Compromise, Settlement, and Release, supra note 231
at 5.
257. Aduddell Indus., Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at 5 (Apr. 30, 2007)
(“All of the directors attended at least 75% of the formal meetings of the Board and the
committees on which they serve.”); Zenex Int’l, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A),
at 5 (Apr. 25, 2006) (“All of the directors attended at least 75% of the formal meetings.”);
Zenex Int’l, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at 4 (May 3, 2005) (“All three
directors attended at least 75% of the formal meetings.”); Zenex Int’l, Inc., Definitive Proxy
Statement (Form 14A), at 3 (Apr. 29, 2004) (“All three directors attend[ed] at least 75% of the
formal meetings.”).
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theory seems sound. Independent directors have a better chance of
serving as a check on management if they can have frank discus-
sions about management without management listening. The
problem is that many of the corporations in my study that agreed
to such provisions already had policies requiring their independent
directors to meet in executive session.258 As just one example, take
the settlement agreement in the derivative suit filed on behalf of
SFBC International, Inc. This agreement includes a requirement
that the independent directors regularly meet outside the presence
of management,259 a requirement that the derivative plaintiff
highlighted as one of the “most significant provisions” in the
settlement agreement.260 Yet a review of the company’s proxy
materials indicates that the board had adopted this policy years
earlier, before the derivative suit was even filed.261
Indeed, many of the settlements included governance reforms
that the corporation adopted well before the date of the settlement
agreement. A prime example is the settlement agreement in the
derivative suit filed on behalf of Rambus, Inc., which was filed with
the court on October 29, 2008. In the settlement agreement,
Rambus highlighted changes that the company had made to the
policies by which it granted stock options.262 The company agreed,
258. This is not surprising given that, again, the listing standards of the major stock
exchanges require independent directors to meet in executive session. See NYSE, Inc., Listed
Company Manual § 303A.03 (2004) (“To empower nonmanagement directors to serve as a
more effective check on management, the nonmanagement directors of each listed company
must meet at regularly scheduled executive sessions without management.”); NASDAQ, Inc.,
Manual, Rule IM-5605-1 (2009) (“Independent Directors must have regularly scheduled
meetings at which only Independent Directors are present (‘executive sessions’).”).
259. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement at Ex. A, § 5(iv), In re SFBC Int’l, Inc. Sec.
& Derivative Litig., 495 F. Supp. 2d 477 (D.N.J. Aug. 6, 2008) (No. 2:06-cv-00165).
260. Memorandum of Law in Support of Final Approval and for an Award of Attorneys’
Fees and Expenses at 5 & n.7, In re SFBC Int’l, 495 F. Supp. 2d 477 (No. 2:06-cv-00165).
261. The company’s proxy statement in 2004 states that “our independent directors have
begun meeting in executive sessions both alone and with our independent auditors and have
adopted a policy to do so at each Board and Committee meeting.” SFBC Int’l, Inc., Definitive
Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at 4 (May 12, 2004). The proxy materials for the next several
years continue to note that the independent directors regularly met in executive session. See,
e.g., SFBC Int’l, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at 4 (May 23, 2005); SFBC
Int’l, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at 5 (July 24, 2006); Pharmanet Dev.
Group, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at 9 (Apr. 30, 2007); Pharmanet Dev.
Group, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at 7 (Apr. 29, 2008).
262. See Stipulation of Settlement ¶ 2 at 9-13, In re Rambus Inc. Derivative Litig., No. C
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for instance, to adopt stock ownership guidelines for its directors
and executive officers that required them to accumulate and
maintain a certain value of the company’s common stock.263 It also
agreed that new hire grants for all employees would be made on the
first trading day of the month following their date of hire.264 Yet
Rambus’s public filings indicate that it enacted these reforms in
2006,265 after the filing of the derivative suit but approximately two
years before the settlement. Several other settlement agreements
in my study also included reforms that the company had imple-
mented prior to entering into the settlement.266 
Many other settlements included additional provisions of
questionable value. In several suits, for example, the plaintiff
corporation agreed as part of the settlement that it would not
violate the law, a requirement that presumably applied prior to the
filing of the suit.267 The settlement agreement in the derivative suit
filed on behalf of McAfee, Inc., for instance, requires the corporation
to ensure that “[t]he members of the Audit Committee [are]
financially literate as may be required by the rules of the NYSE”
and states that “[t]he company shall comply with applicable federal
proxy rules and the laws of the State of Delaware regarding
shareholder proposals.”268 Similarly, the settlement agreement in
06-3513 JF (HRL), 2009 WL 166689 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2008).
263. See id. ¶ 2.4 at 11.
264. See id. ¶ 2.5 at 12 (B).
265. See Rambus, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 72-73 (Sept. 14, 2007) (stating that
the company adopted the stock ownership guidelines in October 2006 and the new hire grant
procedures in November 2006).
266. See, e.g., In re Marvell Tech. Ltd. Derivative Litig., No. C-06-03894-RMW(RS), 2009
WL 1257012 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2009) (stating that Marvell had already dissolved its Stock
Option Committee, amended the charter of its Audit Committee, and adopted new policies
regarding the granting of equity based awards); Stipulation of Settlement ¶ 2.7 at 13, In re
Gen. Motors Corp. Derivative Litig., No. 06-1749 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 18, 2008) (stating that
consideration for the settlement includes certain “changes in internal controls ..., some of
which were implemented since the commencement of the Actions, were adopted in part as
a response to issues of the type raised in the Actions”); Stipulation of Settlement ¶ 2.5 at 11,
Stipulation of Settlement, Ex. D, In re Semtech Corp. Derivative Litig., No. 2:06-cv-03510
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2008) (stating that consideration for the settlement includes reforms made
in 2006 and 2007). 
267. These provisions may provide some small benefit by allowing the derivative plaintiffs
to return to the same court and reopen the same lawsuit if the plaintiff corporation violates
the specified laws. Yet this benefit seems miniscule compared to the costs of a derivative suit. 
268. Stipulation of Settlement at 20, 24, In re McAfee, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 5:06-cv-
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a derivative suit involving Vitesse Semiconductor Corp. states that
“the Company shall comply with legal requirements for proper
disclosure and proper accounting [of stock options].”269 It is hard to
imagine that the corporation benefitted from spending millions in
legal fees only to end up with an agreement prohibiting it and its
executives from violating the law. 
My point here is not that the settlements in these cases were
without merit. My analysis takes issue with select provisions in the
settlement agreements, while recognizing that other provisions
reflect a closer link to the specific harm alleged in the complaint.
Ironically, despite the inefficacy of many of the reforms in my study,
empirical research shows that certain corporate reforms do have
merit and thus that corporate governance settlements may be a
promising concept. These reforms are just not the ones typically
included in corporate governance settlements. 
For example, Professor Lucien Bebchuk and others determined
that six specific policies are negatively correlated with firm
valuation and, therefore, eliminating these provisions may enhance
corporate value.270 These policies include staggered boards, limi-
tations on shareholders’ ability to amend bylaws, supermajority
requirements for charter amendments, supermajority provisions to
approve a merger, golden parachutes, and poison pills.271 Yet, few
corporate governance settlements in my study included these
reforms, which suggests that corporate governance settlements are
not living up to their potential. Only two settlements included
provisions to repeal or amend a poison pill, only five of the settle-
ments include provisions for the annual election of directors, and
few agreements included the other items on Professor Bebchuk’s
list. Instead, the settlements typically included a long list of other
reforms that have no proven impact on corporate performance.
As Professor Bebchuk and his coauthors noted, this “kitchen
3484-JF (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2008). 
269. Amended Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, supra note 201, at Ex. C, ¶ 2(f ).
270. Lucian Bebchuck et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD.
783, 784-87 (2009). Professor Bebchuk and his coauthors were careful to note that the
negative correlation does not establish causality and that additional work in this area is
needed.
271. See id. at 784-85.
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sink” approach can encourage reforms that ultimately accomplish
little.272 
Why do derivative plaintiffs, and their attorneys, agree to
settlements that include provisions of such limited value? This
section began by presenting evidence that corporate governance
settlements are the latest frontier for shareholder activism,273 and
it is certainly true that the reforms in many of these settlements
are the same “best practices” reforms that activist shareholders
promote outside of the courtroom.274 Yet it is just as true that at
least some of these reforms have little value, either empirically or
for the specific companies at issue.275
This observation raises a more cynical possibility about corporate
governance settlements. Although several of these settlements may
be legitimate efforts to reform corporate governance, others may
simply be means for plaintiffs’ attorneys to recover their fees.276
Even if individual defendants will not pay millions of dollars to
settle the suits, the plaintiff corporations may be willing to agree to
nominal reforms and relatively small attorneys’ fees to make the
suits go away. The prevalence of corporate governance settlements
in my study supports the view of scholars and commentators that
many derivative suits are strike suits in which the real winners are
not corporations or their shareholders, but attorneys.277
Indeed, these settlements may reflect the type of “cosmetic
compliance” that scholars such as Kimberly Krawiec have docu-
272. See id. at 787.
273. See supra notes 239-49 and accompanying text.
274. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding
Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1795 (2007) (noting the overlap between the best
practices espoused by the Court in Caremark and those contained in the ensuing shareholder
proposals that activist shareholders presented).
275. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 251.
276. Early studies of derivative suits raised a similar possibility. Roberta Romano’s study
of shareholder litigation in the 1970s and 80s found that parties often settled derivative suits
in exchange for “cosmetic” corporate governance reforms. Romano, supra note 41, at 63. She
stated that “a likely explanation” for these settlements “is the need to paper a record to
justify an award of attorneys’ fees to courts.” Id.
277. See, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and Corporate
Governance, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 3-4 (1999) (arguing that the value “obtained by ‘successful’
plaintiffs [in derivative suits] has often been insubstantial, especially when viewed in light
of the fees sought by plaintiff's counsel”).
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278. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 533 (2003) (“Senior management of business
organizations, for example, may seek to disrupt current practice as little as possible, while
still assuring courts and regulatory agencies that they have met the goals of any new
policy.”).
279. Id.
280. See, e.g., Erickson, supra note 98, at 100.
281. For example, Roberta Romano argued that public pension funds—the type of
institutional investors most common in federal derivative suits—face conflicts of interest that
often prevent them from demanding more meaningful reforms. Roberta Romano, Public
Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 798
(1993) (concluding that “[i]ncreasing public funds’ activism is ... a problematic substitute for
a well-functioning market for corporate control as a means of mitigating the agency problem
at the heart of corporate law”); see also Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS:
Survey Evidence on the Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance,
61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 337-41 (2008) (discussing survey evidence regarding the incentives of
public pension funds to participate in litigation activism).
282. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
mented in other settings.278 Even if corporate governance settle-
ments have the potential to be a meaningful avenue for corporate
reform, they are perhaps even more likely to be an opportunity for
managers to adopt merely cosmetic reforms. Such reforms pass the
minimal judicial scrutiny that is the norm in derivative litigation
without having any tangible impact on corporate controls. In short,
corporate managers “may press an interpretation of law that
signals compliance with the relevant legal regime, but fails to fulfill
the normative goals of regulation.”279
The legal system does not include safeguards to ensure that
corporate governance settlements are comprised of more than
window dressing. As scholars have long noted, derivative plaintiffs
usually own too little stock in the plaintiff corporation to ensure
that settlements are in the best interests of these corporations.280
Even institutional investors who typically own more stock in the
plaintiff corporation often face practical constraints on their ability
to demand more meaningful reform.281 Nor do their attorneys have
the incentive to ensure meaningful reform. As discussed above,
plaintiffs’ attorneys are entitled to compensation in derivative suits
as long as the settlement provided “substantial benefit” to the
plaintiff corporation, a point to which the parties typically stipulate
in the settlement agreement and that is rarely challenged by the
court.282
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The other players in a derivative suit offer little additional pro-
tection. Corporate managers have little incentive to use derivative
suits to overhaul corporate governance in a meaningful way. These
managers are often named in the suits283 and may, therefore, come
to the negotiating table in a defensive posture. Moreover, many
managers likely resist new reforms being forced upon them—after
all, if they thought significant reform was a good idea, they would
have adopted the reforms independent of the litigation. Even courts,
who are charged under Rule 23.1 with protecting the interests of
plaintiff corporations,284 rarely engage in a searching review of
these settlements. Instead, my study found that courts typically
rubberstamp settlements in derivative suits with little inquiry into
the merits of specific governance reforms.285 Given the parade of
weaknesses inherent in the system, it is not surprising that many
corporate governance settlements include only cosmetic changes. 
Before writing off corporate governance settlements entirely,
however, perhaps we can analyze these settlements from another
angle. Thus far, the inquiry has focused on whether corporate
governance settlements benefit plaintiff corporations or their
shareholders. It is possible, however, that even if many of these
settlements have little compensatory value for corporations, the
value of these settlements instead lies in deterring future
misconduct—a final possibility to which we now turn. 
283. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
284. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1.
285. The judges in my study rarely probed the terms of the settlements. Yet there have
been cases in which courts played a more active role in reviewing the settlements, which can
have a positive impact on the final settlement terms. A prime example is the derivative suit
filed on behalf of Zoran Corporation. The parties originally agreed to a settlement that
included only the repricing of options and corporate governance reforms. The court rejected
the settlement, calling it “illusory” because the company adopted many of the terms of the
settlement independent of the derivative suit. Order Denying Preliminary Approval of
Proposed Settlement of Derivative Action at 16-17, In re Zoran Corp. Derivative Litig., No.
C 06-5503 WHA (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2008). Forced back to the negotiating table, the parties
negotiated a new settlement in which the plaintiff corporation received a multimillion cash
payment. See Lead Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Proposed Settlement at ¶
2.4, In re Zoran Corp. Derivative Litig., No. 06-05503-WHA (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2008).
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286. Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth:
The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 106 (2006); A.C.
Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal To Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as
Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 929-30 (1999).
287. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 286, at 105-06.
288. See id.
289. See id. at 106.
290. See id.; see also Joe Nocera, Serving Time, but Lacking Remorse, N.Y. TIMES, June
7, 2008, at C1.
291. See supra Part II.D.2-3.
C. The Possibility of Deterrence
A growing group of scholars has argued that the aim of represen-
tative litigation, including derivative suits or class actions, should
be deterrence rather than compensation.286 Myriam Gilles and Gary
Friedman, for example, argued that representative litigation is ill-
suited to providing meaningful compensation, whereas it can have
a powerful impact in deterring future misconduct.287 In the class
action arena, class members often have little interest in recouping
small-scale damage awards and, therefore, they argued that class
action law should devote less attention to protecting class members’
rights in trifling sums that they often do not want.288 Instead, the
focus should be on evaluating whether class actions adequately
deter misconduct.289 Class actions perform well under this analysis,
according to Gilles and Friedman, because “[e]xecutives tempted to
lie about earnings are more concerned about Bill Lerach and
Melvyn Weiss [two formerly high-profile plaintiffs’ attorneys
currently in prison for giving kickbacks to clients] than they are
about the Securities and Exchange Commission.”290 Perhaps the
same logic applies to derivative suits.
Derivative suits may have their most promise when viewed
through the lens of deterrence. This promise is not always evident,
however, especially in light of the outcomes of the suits in my study.
As explained above, approximately 70 percent of the suits were
dismissed.291 It is hard to see at first glance how such dismissals
meaningfully deter corporate officers and directors. Indeed, as other
scholars have recognized, the deterrent value of litigation depends
in large part on two factors: the sanctions imposed in the litigation
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and the social shame from being named in the litigation.292 In the
derivative suits that end in dismissal, the individual defendants
face no sanctions whatsoever. Moreover, the high dismissal rate
contributes to the prevailing belief that shareholder litigation is
frivolous,293 which diminishes the social shame associated with
being named as a defendant in such litigation.
The remaining 30 percent of suits that settled had more mixed
deterrent effects. Many of the stock option suits in my study did
successfully target the individual defendants, forcing them to pay
money out of their own pockets and/or reprice or forfeit their stock
options.294 These settlements likely had some deterrent value,
demonstrating that backdating stock options does not pay.
The classic derivative suits in my study, that is, those that did
not involve backdated stock options, had less deterrent value. This
value certainly did not come from the outcomes of the suits. After
all, only two of the classic derivative public company cases ended
with any of the defendants paying any money out of their own
pockets. In the remaining cases, the individual defendants were
largely absent. As detailed above, the plaintiff corporation typically
agreed to reform specific parts of its corporate governance, from
adding additional directors to hiring experts to advise the board.295
The lives of the individual defendants, however, were unchanged.
If corporate managers are contemplating engaging in malfeasance,
it is hard to see how the threat of corporate governance settlements
will deter them. 
Moreover, the deterrent value of these suits must be viewed in
light of the other litigation commenced as a result of the alleged
wrongdoing. The vast majority of the derivative suits in my study
filed on behalf of public companies were accompanied by a parallel
securities class action.296 These class actions were typically filed
against the plaintiff corporation and many of the same individual
292. James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3, 5
(1999).
293. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
295. See supra Part III.A.
296. Far fewer of the private company suits were accompanied by a parallel securities
class action. 
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defendants named in the derivative suits. Many companies and
individual defendants were also targeted in enforcement actions
filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Accordingly, any
deterrent value is likely reduced by the fact that the company and
many of its managers are already named in parallel litigation,
litigation that typically results in stiffer penalties and thus greater
deterrent value.
Yet it is critical to recognize that derivative suits may have
deterrent value even if they rarely end with meaningful sanctions
against the alleged wrongdoers. Importantly, derivative suits likely
deter corporate managers who do not want to suffer the repu-
tational harm of being publicly identified with corporate wrongdo-
ing.297 These suits may also deter directors who are risk averse in
the face of the possibility of liability.298 Moreover, most corporate
managers do not know just how unsuccessful most derivative suits
are.299 These managers may decide not to engage in misconduct
simply because they overestimate the likelihood that they will face
sanctions.
Furthermore, fiduciary duties are alive and well in the board-
room even if they are largely absent from the courtroom. Derivative
suits are the procedural mechanism to enforce fiduciary duties,300
and these duties retain a strong presence in corporate law despite
the now-documented shortcomings associated with derivative
suits. Corporate lawyers still spend significant time explaining
fiduciary duties to corporate managers, and managers still listen.301
297. See Cox, supra note 292, at 5 (arguing that an additional deterrent of shareholder
litigation is “the social opprobrium that attaches to the suits’ defendents”).
298. See, e.g., Brandi, supra note 146, at 386-87 (noting that directors’ risk aversion, which
stems from their focus only on the litigation at hand and their potential personal liability,
often leads to settlements with plaintiffs).
299. See id. at 386 (pointing out that most directors and officers “tend not to be
experienced in dealing with ... shareholder litigation”).
300. Shareholders can also bring fiduciary duty claims directly if they, rather than the
corporation, suffered the injury. Such direct claims are common, at least in the Delaware
Court of Chancery, but outside the scope of this study. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall
S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57
VAND. L. REV. 133, 167-68 (2004) (analyzing the rise of acquisition-oriented shareholder class
actions). 
301. See generally Lyman Johnson & Dennis Garvis, Are Corporate Officers Advised About
Fiduciary Duties?, 4 BUS. LAW. 1105 (2009).
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Seminal Delaware decisions such as Disney,302 Caremark,303 and
Van Gorkom304 have shaped the way that boards approach key
corporate decisions, encouraging boards to surround themselves
with knowledgeable advisors, ensure independent review of related
party transactions, and monitor corporate compliance practices.305
Indeed, these high-profile cases have likely had a much greater
impact on the best practices of corporate boards than the majority
of securities class actions. Fiduciary duties still provide an impor-
tant framework for board decision making even if the enforcement
mechanisms for these duties are broken. 
In the end, however, without an effective enforcement mecha-
nism, doctrine can only do so much. Even if fiduciary duties shape
discussions in corporate boardrooms, these duties standing alone
cannot compel managers to comply with their duties or penalize
disloyal managers. The chief function of derivative suits should be
to enforce the fiduciary duties of corporate officers and directors.
As derivative suits become simply another tool of activist sharehold-
ers and eager attorneys, this function is increasingly left by the
wayside. 
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CONCLUSION
Shareholder derivative suits stand at a crossroads. Mounting
empirical evidence reveals that the vast majority of shareholder
derivative suits do not benefit the corporations on whose behalf the
suits are brought. As my study reveals, shareholder derivative suits
have become the latest battleground for shareholder activism, with
shareholders agreeing to settle shareholder derivative suits in
exchange for corporate governance reforms that are often untested
and/or patently unhelpful for both the corporations and their
shareholders. The chief beneficiaries of this strategy are law firms,
which receive hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars in
attorneys’ fees.
As the focus turns to reforming shareholder derivative suits,
several possibilities emerge. At the very least, district courts should
exercise far more oversight over settlements in these suits. Courts
should not simply accept the parties’ representations regarding the
merits of the settlements, especially when settlements are com-
prised solely of corporate governance reforms. Instead, courts
should probe the settlement terms in shareholder derivative suits
much more carefully and examine whether the specific reforms set
out in the settlement agreements are likely to benefit the specific
corporations named in the suits.
The time is coming, however, when we will have to address the
broader question of whether to draw the curtain on shareholder
derivative suits altogether. My study finds that shareholder
derivative suits are broken, a conclusion that leads to two
possible—but very different—avenues for reform. If shareholder
derivative suits are duplicative of other litigation, then corporate
law may not need them. If, on the other hand, shareholder deriva-
tive suits have the potential to serve as an independent and
meaningful check on corporate misconduct, then policymakers and
scholars should focus on reforming these suits. For example, the
law could restrict the filing of derivative suits to those shareholders
who own sufficient stock in the plaintiff corporation to represent
the corporation’s interests in an effective way. Alternatively,
policymakers may consider eliminating procedural hurdles such
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as the demand requirement for shareholders with a sizeable
ownership interest in the plaintiff corporation. The choice between
reforming shareholder derivative suits and abandoning them
depends on their role within the larger landscape of corporate law,
an area that awaits further empirical inquiry. 
These issues remain for another day, but one thing is clear—
although shareholder activism has moved to the courtroom, there
is little evidence that this move has advanced the cause of corporate
accountability. In the end, the courtroom is not the best place to
reform corporate governance. 

